Contemporary Political Culture and Postmodernity

Content

1. Philosophical Framework
2. Introduction
3. Research Overview
   • The Influence of Postmodernity on Political Culture and Subjectivity
   • Postmodernity and the Spread of Disinformation/Polarization in Digital Politics
   • Reconceptualizing Identity, Gender, and Subjectivity in Postmodernity
   • Postmodernity and the Transformation of Political and Economic Structure
   • Postmodernity and Ideology: The End of Ideology or Its New Forms?
4. Critique and Limitations
5. Conclusion

Philosophical Framework

Contemporary political culture is viewed through the lens of postmodern theory, which questions established metanarratives and singular truth. In the tradition of post-structuralism, represented by thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Jean Baudrillard, political discourse is understood as a field of struggle for power and meaning, where traditional ideologies are deconstructed and reinterpreted. Postmodernity here acts not merely as a cultural phenomenon, but as a way of organizing knowledge and power that influences the formation of identities and political practices.

Transition from modernity to postmodernity is accompanied by a shift from fixed, stable structures to fragmented, multiple, and contextual forms of political culture. This is reflected in the changing ways of legitimizing power and communication, where media become not just channels for transmitting information, but active participants in creating political reality. Postmodernity provides a theoretical framework for analyzing contemporary political processes in which truth and identity become subjects of constant play and redefinition.

Introduction

Contemporary political culture is characterized by fragmentation and a pluralism of values, reflecting a rejection of universal ideological systems and a shift towards multiple, often conflicting narratives. This process is closely linked to the postmodern deconstruction of traditional ideologies, which breaks down monolithic political discourses and generates flexible, multiple forms of political identity [Jameson, 1991]. In such conditions, political identity ceases to be a fixed category and becomes fluid, reflecting the complexity and ambiguity of contemporary political experience (Taylor).

Media play a key role in shaping and transforming political culture, acting not only as sources of information but also as spaces of simulation and hyperreality, where political meanings are constructed and deconstructed [Baudrillard, 1995]. The influence of postmodernity manifests in the undermining of the idea of objective truth in political discourse, leading to an increase in political cynicism and apathy, driven by skepticism towards traditional institutions and their rhetoric [Frie, 2003]. At the same time, postmodernity contributes to the emergence of new forms of political activism based on irony, parody, and networked communications, which changes the landscape of political struggle and the legitimation of power.

However, the question of whether postmodernity existed as an era and to what extent it has concluded remains open. Some researchers point to signs of a transition to post-postmodernity or post-fact, where traditional postmodern strategies are no longer able to adequately describe political reality, especially in the context of globalization and the digital media environment [Törnberg, 2018]. This poses the task of re-evaluating political culture in light of new challenges and opportunities generated by both technological changes and the transformation of social identities. Contemporary political culture is at the crossroads of many trends, where postmodernity acts simultaneously as an analytical tool and an object of critique, and its influence is manifested in changes in political practices, identities, and modes of communication. The next step is to understand how exactly these changes affect the structure of power and political dynamics in conditions of global interconnectedness and local conflicts.

Research Overview

The Influence of Postmodernity on Political Culture and Subjectivity

How does postmodernity change political culture and subjectivity? This question seems paradoxical, as postmodernity is often associated with the destruction of foundations, but not with their replacement. Roger Frie, in his work “Erich Fromm and Contemporary Psychoanalysis: From Modernism to Postmodernism,” emphasizes that postmodernity does not simply abolish subjectivity, but transforms it, introducing new forms and contexts. He writes: “We need a historical perspective that takes into account cultural and political differences within the same time, as well as permeable boundaries between different eras. Neither modernism nor postmodernism are unitary, coherent, or self-evident realities” [Frie, 2003, p. 860]. This means that subjectivity in postmodernity becomes multiple, fragmented, and contextual.

On the other hand, Pirkkohisa Ahponen views postmodernity as a challenge to the traditional foundations of subjectivity, destroying the “authenticity” of aesthetic modernism and its referential logic. He argues: “Postmodernity is important precisely because it allows us to characterize new features of culture and society in their seductiveness, seriality, and permeability. With continuous transformations, postmodernity becomes discrete with the representations and referential logic of the 'authenticity' of aesthetic modernism” [Ahponen, 1990]. Here, postmodernity appears as a process of deconstruction and reinterpretation that destroys the traditional foundations of subjectivity, but does not completely annihilate it.

In this context, Nancy Chodorow's position is interesting, as she emphasizes that postmodernity does not abolish subjectivity, but rather transforms it, especially in aspects of gender and identity. She writes: “Postmodern and modern are not homogeneous or mutually exclusive; they contain within themselves cultural and political differences, as well as permeable boundaries” [Chodorow, 2005, p. 1100]. This highlights the complexity and heterogeneity of subjectivity in postmodern society, where identity becomes flexible and multiple.

Jean Baudrillard, in turn, introduces the concepts of simulation and hyperreality, which have a profound impact on political culture. He argues that in postmodernity, signs and symbols lose their connection to reality and become independent models: “The contemporary West is a place where signs have lost their referents, a place of 'models,' 'simulacra,' endless copies that no longer refer to an original” [Baudrillard, 2018, p. 45]. In political discourse, this leads to the simulation of political events and images, which undermines traditional notions of objective truth.

Fredric Jameson views postmodernity as the cultural logic of late capitalism, where political culture becomes fragmented and oriented towards superficial signs and styles. He writes: “Postmodernism is the cultural logic of late capitalism, characterized by fragmentation, superficiality, and a rejection of deep narratives” [Jameson, 1992, p. 68]. This explains why traditional ideologies and political identities break down into many particular and local forms.

An important aspect is the role of media in shaping political culture. John Fiske emphasizes that media do not merely transmit information, but actively shape cultural meanings and subjectivity: “Media create a space for the struggle over meaning, where different groups construct their identities and political positions” [Fiske, 1990]. In postmodernity, media become an arena for multiple competing narratives, leading to pluralism and fragmentation of political culture.

These positions contrast with more traditional views that see postmodernity only as a crisis of subjectivity and political culture. For example, Norbert Wiley and Mark Gottdiener note that postmodernity destroys foundations, but at the same time offers new forms of cultural life where subjectivity becomes more flexible and multidimensional [Wiley & Gottdiener, 1996]. This confirms the idea that postmodernity does not destroy the subject, but changes its nature.

The influence of postmodernity on political identity is particularly evident in the works of Charles Taylor, who views identity as a narrative formed in dialogue with culture and history. He writes: “Identity is not something fixed, but a process that develops in the context of social and cultural interactions” [Taylor, 1994]. In postmodernity, this process becomes more fragmented and multiple, reflecting the general tendency towards pluralism and the deconstruction of traditional political identities.

Michel Foucault, in his studies of discourse and power, shows how postmodernity changes the ways of legitimizing power through the deconstruction of traditional narratives and institutional structures. He argues: “Power is not simply repressive; it is productive and permeates all social relations through discourses” [Foucault, 1978]. This means that political culture in postmodernity becomes an arena for the struggle for meaning and power through discursive practices, and subjectivity is formed in these processes.

Gina Lynch explores the impact of globalization on political culture and subjectivity, noting that postmodernity reflects the conflict between global processes and local identities. She writes: “Globalization creates new forms of political culture, where local identities become more significant in response to universalization” [Lynch, 2005]. This reinforces the fragmentation and pluralism in political culture characteristic of postmodernity. Postmodernity does not simply destroy the traditional foundations of political culture and subjectivity, but also offers new forms of their organization—flexible, multiple, fragmented. The question is how these new forms affect political communication and the processes of public opinion formation in the era of digital media, where disinformation spreads and polarization intensifies. This leads to the next important aspect—the role of postmodernity in the spread of disinformation and polarization in digital politics.

Postmodernity and the Spread of Disinformation/Polarization in Digital Politics

If in the previous section we discussed how postmodernity fragments political culture and subjectivity, it is now worth considering how these processes manifest in the digital space, where political communication becomes an arena for disinformation and polarization. Postmodernity, with its doubt in objective truth and deconstruction of traditional narratives, creates fertile ground for information to cease being a unified field of facts and transform into a field of multiple, often conflicting interpretations.

Petter Törnberg, in his work “Echo chambers and viral misinformation” (2018), proposes a model showing that echo chambers—communities where people primarily interact with like-minded individuals—not only amplify polarization but also contribute to the viral spread of disinformation. He writes: “The combination of clustering and homophily disproportionately impacts the capacity for complex contagion, facilitating a 'bandwagon' effect” [Törnberg, 2018, p.16]. This means that when people gather in homogeneous groups, information that resonates with their views spreads much faster and wider than it would in a more heterogeneous network.

Interestingly, Törnberg emphasizes not only the role of algorithms and filters but also the very structure of social networks as a factor that shapes these echo chambers. He notes that “not only algorithmic 'filter bubbles' affect what information we see, but also the dynamics of social clustering change the dynamics of virality” [Törnberg, 2018]. This calls into question the idea that technology itself is neutral—it creates conditions for amplifying social processes that lead to polarization.

In this context, Jürgen Habermas's view of the public sphere becomes particularly important. Habermas, in “The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere” (1991), suggested that media could create a space for rational dialogue and the formation of public opinion. However, as Törnberg observes, “the disappearance of traditional media's mediation has not led to the creation of an online Habermasian public sphere, but rather to the loss of a common world that could unite people” [Törnberg, 2018, p.52]. Instead, a “world without a world” emerges—fragmented, where people seek new communities to feel a sense of belonging.

Janna Koschorke and co-authors (2019), in their article “Facts Shifting to the Left,” analyze how the postmodern deconstruction of facts and truth has transformed in the era of post-fact. They point out that “post-structuralist ideas, which once served as a tool for criticizing power and ideology, are now used to justify the rejection of objective truth and the spread of alternative facts” [Koschorke et al., 2019]. This creates a paradox: tools of critical thinking, designed to expose manipulation, themselves become means of manipulation.

Fredric Jameson, in “Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism” (1991), links these processes to the logic of late capitalism, where information and culture become commodities, and political discourse becomes a spectacle. He writes: “Postmodernism is the cultural logic of late capitalism, where everything becomes superficial, fragmented, and ironic” [Jameson, 1991, p.45]. In digital politics, this manifests in political messages becoming memes, parodies, and serious discourse giving way to a play of symbols and images.

However, not all researchers share pessimism regarding digital media. Habermas and Hanns Kellner (2004) note that online platforms open new opportunities for pluralistic political communication, allowing different voices to be heard. But they also warn that “in practice, these platforms tend to reinforce processes of stratification and inequality, as well as lead to self-isolation and tribalization” [Habermas & Kellner, 2004]. That is, the potential for democracy in the digital space exists, but it is realized with great difficulty.

Gina Lynch, exploring globalization and political culture, emphasizes that digital technologies amplify local identities and conflicts, leading to increased polarization. She writes: “The global network does not erase local differences; on the contrary, it makes them more visible and conflictual” [Lynch, 2019]. This confirms the thesis that digital politics is not just an expansion of the public sphere, but a complex process of fragmentation and competition for attention.

The question arises: how to combat disinformation and polarization if they are embedded in the structure of digital networks and reinforced by the cultural logic of postmodernity? Törnberg suggests that the solution lies in understanding the “external effects” of interaction in social networks and in designing technologies that will promote unity rather than fragmentation. But this requires deep analysis and rethinking the very nature of digital communication [Törnberg, 2018].

In this sense, Habermas's views on rational dialogue and a common public sphere prove to be both utopian and necessary. If digital politics turns into a battlefield of echo chambers and simulacra, then the search for new forms of communication that can restore a common world becomes a key task. This leads us to the next important aspect—rethinking identity and subjectivity in the conditions of postmodernity, where the boundaries between “self” and “other” are blurred, and political identity becomes multiple and flexible. The spread of disinformation and polarization in digital politics is not just a technical problem, but a symptom of deep cultural and social transformations associated with postmodernity. Understanding these processes requires not only an analysis of network structures but also a critical rethinking of the cultural narratives that shape our perception of truth and political action. The next step is to explore how postmodernity changes the very concept of identity, gender, and subjectivity, which will allow a deeper understanding of the nature of contemporary political conflicts and opportunities for overcoming them.

Reconceptualizing Identity, Gender, and Subjectivity in Postmodernity

The transition from digital polarization and disinformation to questions of identity and subjectivity in postmodernity is not merely a change of topic, but a logical continuation. If in the digital space we observe fragmentation and a multiplicity of narratives, then in the realm of identity, these processes acquire an even deeper and more fundamental character. Postmodernity does not simply destroy traditional political ideologies; it questions the very stability and fixity of identities, including gender identities.

Gediman, in his work, emphasizes that postmodernity blurs traditional categories of sex and gender, which were rigidly fixed in modernist paradigms. He writes that “postmodernity offers a perspective in which sex and gender cease to be binary and fixed, becoming instead a mixture, fluidity, and multiplicity” [Gediman, 2005, p. 1065]. This is not merely a theoretical wordplay, but a reflection of real social processes where identity becomes a field of constant changes and intersections.

Nancy Chodorow, one of the leading feminist theorists, develops this idea, linking it to the psychoanalytic tradition. She points out that postmodernity allows for “breaking down classical binary oppositions, such as male/female, and opening up space for understanding gender as a socially and psychologically constructed phenomenon” [Chodorow, 2005, p. 1102]. In this context, gender ceases to be natural or biologically determined, but becomes the result of complex historical and cultural processes.

Feminist critique, presented by Felski, also emphasizes that postmodernity opens new horizons for the analysis of identity, especially female identity. She argues that “placing women at the center of analysis changes our understanding of both modernism and postmodernism, revealing hidden mechanisms of power and representation” [Felski, 2002, p. 45]. This shifts the focus from universal categories to specific, local, and multiple identities, which challenges traditional political structures.

An important aspect is that postmodernity does not simply offer new categories, but questions the very idea of a stable subject. Freud and his followers, including Erich Fromm, viewed subjectivity as the result of internal conflicts and social influences, but within the modernist paradigm. Fromm, as Frie notes, saw the transition from modernism to postmodernism as a paradigm shift, where “the subject becomes fragmented, multiple, and constantly changing” [Frie, 2003, p. 860]. This is reflected in political culture, where identity can no longer serve as a stable basis for collective action.

Katerina Stimpson, in her commentary, emphasizes that postmodernity “offers a new perspective on gender and gender roles, where traditional notions of femininity and masculinity are deconstructed and reinterpreted” [Stimpson, 2005, p. 1125]. She points out that this is not just a theoretical shift, but a real change in how people experience and express their identity.

In this context, it becomes clear why postmodernity is closely linked to the development of identity-based political movements. Feminism, LGBTQ+ movements, and other forms of activism use postmodern ideas to expand political space and combat the hegemony of traditional norms. However, as Chodorow notes, this also creates new complexities: “the shift to multiple identities creates a challenge for political solidarity, as common grounds for collective action are blurred” [Chodorow, 2005, p. 1115].

Postmodernity not only expands the spectrum of identities but also questions the very possibility of a unified political subjectivity. This creates a paradox: on the one hand, there is more freedom for self-expression, and on the other, fragmentation and the risk of political fragmentation increase. Felski emphasizes that “postmodernity requires us to rethink political strategy, which must take into account the multiplicity and intersections of identities, rather than striving for universalization” [Felski, 2002, p. 52].

An important addition to this discourse is the analysis of the social construction of identity proposed by Goodman. He shows that internal working models and representations of objects in the psyche are linked to social processes, confirming the idea that identity is not a fixed property but a dynamic process [Goodman, 2005]. This aligns with the postmodern view of subjectivity as constantly constructed and reconstructed.

At the same time, critics of postmodernity, such as Fromm, warn of the risks of excessive fragmentation of the subject. Fromm saw in modernism an attempt to create a holistic subject, and although postmodernity destroys this wholeness, it also generates new forms of alienation and meaninglessness [Frie, 2003, p. 865]. This resonates with observations about political apathy and cynicism that arise in conditions of postmodern skepticism.

Finally, it should be noted that postmodernity does not negate the historicity of identity, but rather emphasizes its contextuality and multiplicity. Felski points out that “historical periods and cultural contexts influence the formation of identities, and postmodernity helps to reveal these interconnections, especially concerning women and marginalized groups” [Felski, 2002, p. 48]. This opens up new opportunities for critical analysis and political intervention. The reconceptualization of identity, gender, and subjectivity in postmodernity is not merely a theoretical turn, but a fundamental change in the understanding of political culture and subjectivity. It reflects a shift from fixed, universal categories to multiple, fluid, and intersecting forms of identity, which creates new challenges for political organization and legitimation.

This shift in the understanding of subjectivity and identity leads us to the next question: how do these new forms of subjectivity affect the transformation of political and economic structures? After all, if the subject becomes multiple and fragmented, then traditional institutions of power, based on unity and stability, are also called into question. This is precisely the topic of the next subsection.

Postmodernity and the Transformation of Political and Economic Structure

The reconceptualization of identity and subjectivity in postmodernity inevitably leads to the question of how these changes are reflected in broader political and economic institutions. If the individual becomes multiple and flexible, what happens to the stability and unity of political structures? The answer to this question lies in understanding that postmodernity does not merely destroy traditional forms, but also generates new ways of organizing and legitimizing power.

David Harvey, in his work “The Condition of Postmodernity,” emphasizes that postmodernity is associated with a shift from rigid, centralized forms of production and management to “flexible accumulation”—a model in which economic processes become more fragmented, adaptive, and decentralized [Harvey, 1991]. This is not just a technical shift, but a fundamental transformation of the political-economic landscape. Harvey writes: “The transition to flexible accumulation means that capitalism ceases to be monolithic; it becomes a network of disparate but interconnected processes that require new forms of governance and control” [Harvey, 1991, p. 109]. Such fragmentation of institutional structures creates a paradox: on the one hand, centralized power disappears; on the other, the need for new mechanisms of integration arises.

In this context, the position of Ash Amin and other researchers of the post-Fordist economy complements Harvey. Amin notes that flexibility and fragmentation do not mean chaos, but rather a new form of organization where local and global processes intertwine in a complex network [Amin, 1996]. He emphasizes that “post-Fordism is not just an economic model, but a socio-political phenomenon that changes the relationship between the state, the market, and society” [Amin, 1996, p. 45]. This also changes the political structure: traditional institutions, based on national sovereignty and centralized governance, prove ineffective in a global economy.

However, fragmentation does not mean complete disintegration. Andreas Georg Scherer and Guido Palazzo, in their article “The New Political Role of Business in a Globalized World,” show that in the context of globalization, business structures take on new social and political functions, filling the vacuum created by the weakening of traditional state institutions [Scherer & Palazzo, 2010]. They argue: “Many companies begin to perceive themselves not only as economic agents but also as political actors, taking responsibility for social and environmental issues that go beyond legal requirements” [Scherer & Palazzo, 2010, p. 88]. This indicates the emergence of new forms of integration, where the private sector becomes part of the political structure.

Such an expansion of the role of business in politics reflects a broader trend towards the “politicization” of economic actors, which calls into question the classical division between economy and politics. Paul Clarke and David Harvey, analyzing postmodernity, note that “the postmodern era is characterized not only by the breakdown of old structures but also by the emergence of new forms of interaction that are difficult to fit into traditional categories” [Clarke & Harvey, 1991, p. 142]. They emphasize that “flexible accumulation” requires new forms of governance that are simultaneously decentralized and integrated, creating a complex political dynamic.

An important aspect of this transformation is the change in the ways of legitimizing power. If previously legitimacy was built on national institutions and ideologies, now it increasingly relies on flexible networks and multi-level structures. This leads to power becoming less visible and more distributed, which complicates its analysis and critique. Jean Baudrillard, in his works on simulacra and hyperreality, points out that modern power increasingly functions through signs and images, rather than through direct coercion: “Power becomes a simulacrum, where the real and the symbolic merge, creating new forms of control” [Baudrillard, 1995, p. 76].

This idea resonates with Michel Foucault's analysis, who viewed power as a discursive practice permeating all levels of society. In postmodernity, according to Foucault, power is not centralized but distributed through a multitude of micro-power relations, which corresponds to the flexible and fragmented structure of economy and politics [Foucault]. The transformation of political and economic structure is not only a change in forms of governance but also a change in the very nature of power.

Roger Frie, exploring the transition from modernism to postmodernism in psychoanalysis, emphasizes that such transformations affect both subjectivity and social institutions simultaneously: “Postmodernity destroys monolithic structures of identity and power, opening up space for multiplicity and flexibility, but at the same time creates new forms of uncertainty and instability” [Frie, 2003, p. 860]. This is also reflected in political institutions, which are forced to adapt to new conditions, often losing their former stability.

At the same time, Mark Olssen and Michael Peters, in the context of neoliberalism and the knowledge economy, point out that the transformation of the political and economic structure is associated with the strengthening of market mechanisms in the management of education and science, which is part of a broader trend towards “performativity” and measurability of results [Olssen & Peters, 2005]. They note: “Neoliberal policies introduce market principles into traditionally public spheres, which changes the logic of power and governance” [Olssen & Peters, 2005, p. 120]. This is an example of how economic logic penetrates the political sphere, transforming it.

The question arises: if traditional institutions of power and economy are fragmented and restructured, how is social integration maintained? The answer is provided by the concept of new forms of integration, proposed by Scherer and Palazzo. They show that business and other non-state actors take on functions previously performed by state institutions, creating new networks of responsibility and interaction [Scherer & Palazzo, 2010]. This is not just a replacement, but a complex process in which old and new coexist and conflict.

An important addition to this is the understanding that postmodernity does not abolish political struggle, but changes its forms. Instead of classical ideological conflicts, new, more fragmented and localized confrontations arise, reflecting the complexity and heterogeneity of modern society. This is also confirmed by Petter Törnberg, analyzing the influence of social networks on political dynamics: “Social media create echo chambers and intensify polarization, which reflects the fragmentation of the political space and complicates integration processes” [Törnberg, 2018]. The transformation of political and economic structure in postmodernity is not just the disintegration of old forms, but the emergence of new, flexible, and multi-layered systems that require a rethinking of traditional notions of power and legitimacy. In this context, it becomes obvious that the question of the fate of ideology and its new forms will inevitably come to the fore, since ideology has traditionally served as a link between the individual and the political structure.

The transition to the next section— “Postmodernity and Ideology: The End of Ideology or Its New Forms?” —logically follows from the consideration of how political and economic structures are changing. If power and governance become flexible and fragmented, how does the ideological basis that supports them change? This question opens up space for further analysis, where postmodernity appears not as the end of ideology, but as its transformation into new, less obvious, and more complex forms.

Postmodernity and Ideology: The End of Ideology or Its New Forms?

The transition from traditional political and economic structures to postmodern transformations, discussed in the previous section, inevitably raises the question of the fate of ideology. If classical ideologies are systems of meanings claiming universality and objectivity, then postmodernity, according to many, destroys these claims, immersing us in a world of simulacra and endless copies without an original. Jean Baudrillard, one of the key theorists of postmodernity, argued that “the contemporary West is a place where signs have lost their referents, a place of 'models,' 'simulacra,' endless copies that no longer refer to any original” [Baudrillard, 2018]. In this context, ideology as a system of truths and values ceases to be a reliable guide, turning into a play of surfaces and images.

However, such a radical thesis about the “end of ideology” meets resistance. Slavoj Žižek, drawing on the Hegelian-Althusserian tradition, emphasizes that the idea of a post-ideological world ignores a fundamental fact: “even if we don't take things seriously, we still do them” [Zizek, 1990, p. 12]. In other words, ideology does not disappear; it merely changes masks and forms, becoming less obvious but no less influential. Žižek proposes to view ideology as a “sublimation” of social contradictions, where subjects are divided by internal antagonism, and ideology functions as a mechanism that conceals this duality.

Fredric Jameson, in turn, analyzes postmodernity as the “cultural logic of late capitalism,” where ideology becomes increasingly fragmented and superficial, yet retains its function of legitimizing and reproducing the social order [Jameson, 1991]. He emphasizes that postmodernity does not abolish ideology but transforms it into “post-ideological” forms—for example, into consumer practices, mass culture, and media simulacra that mask real social conflicts.

An important addition to these positions is Roger Frie's analysis, who, in the context of psychoanalysis and cultural theory, points to the transition from modernist to postmodern forms of subjectivity and ideology. Frie emphasizes that ideology in postmodernity becomes less coherent and more fragmented, yet retains the ability to influence unconscious structures and practices [Frie, 2003]. He draws attention to the fact that ideological mechanisms now operate not through rigid dogmas, but through a “play” of symbols and identities, which complicates their recognition and critique.

Michel Foucault, although not directly writing about the “end of ideology,” made a significant contribution to understanding how discourses and power intertwine in postmodern society. His concept of power as “producing discourse” shows that ideology does not disappear but becomes part of complex networks of knowledge and power, where truths are constructed and deconstructed depending on context and interests [Foucault]. This confirms the idea that ideology in postmodernity does not die but transforms into more flexible and hidden forms.

John Fiske, exploring media and culture, emphasizes that media in postmodernity become an arena where ideologies are not only reproduced but also constantly deconstructed and reinterpreted. Media simulacra create a “hyperreality” in which the boundaries between the real and the imaginary are blurred, and ideological meanings become multi-layered and contradictory [Fisk]. This amplifies the effect of fragmentation and multiplicity of ideological narratives.

In this context, a paradox arises: on the one hand, postmodernity deconstructs traditional ideologies, destroying their claims to universality; on the other hand, ideology does not disappear but becomes more hidden, fragmented, and adaptive. This leads to the emergence of new forms of ideology that are difficult to identify and criticize because they are masked as irony, parody, or “post-ideological” discourse.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that in the digital age and social media, ideological forms spread through complex networks where “echo chambers” and algorithmic filters amplify polarization and contribute to the viral spread of both true and false narratives [Törnberg, 2018]. This creates a new dynamic of ideological influence, based on emotional engagement and social confirmation, rather than rational arguments.

The question arises: how is critical reflection and resistance to ideology possible in such conditions? Žižek suggests that precisely the recognition of the internal antagonism of the subject and ideology as “sublimation” can become a starting point for political action [Zizek, 1990]. Jameson points to the need to restore critical thinking capable of recognizing hidden ideological mechanisms in culture and media [Jameson, 1991]. Foucault, in turn, proposes analyzing power and discourse as interconnected processes to identify points of resistance and alternative practices [Foucault].

Nevertheless, the question remains open as to how new forms of ideology can mobilize political subjectivity and create collective projects. Postmodernity, with its fragmentation and multiplicity, generates political disorientation and cynicism, which hinders the formation of stable ideological platforms. At the same time, new forms of activism and protests, based on networked technologies and cultural practices, demonstrate the potential for creating new political meanings and identities. Postmodernity does not mean the end of ideology, but rather its metamorphosis into new, less obvious, and more complex forms. This requires a rethinking of methods of critique and political action that take into account the fragmentation, multiplicity, and networked nature of the contemporary ideological space. The challenge is to learn to see and analyze these new forms, without succumbing to superficial skepticism or irony, which themselves can become instruments of ideological control.

The next logical step is a critical review of these positions and an attempt at synthesis that will allow us to assess how postmodern theories of ideology correspond to real political processes and how they can be used to understand and transform contemporary political culture.

Critique and Limitations

One of the key weaknesses of postmodern analysis of political culture is its tendency towards excessive fragmentation and pluralism, which creates a paradoxical situation: on the one hand, the deconstruction of traditional ideologies and narratives expands the space for a multiplicity of voices, while on the other, it hinders the formation of stable political subjects and collective actions. Roger Frie notes that postmodernity transforms subjectivity, making it multiple and contextual, but at the same time creates new forms of uncertainty and instability that can lead to political apathy and cynicism [Frie, 2003]. If not for this fragmentation, political culture could maintain more stable and integrative forms of identity, capable of effective political action. However, critics point out that ignoring this complexity leads to utopian expectations of a unified political will and disregards the real processes of disintegration and conflict.

A second significant problem is related to the role of media and digital technologies in shaping political culture. Petter Törnberg's model demonstrates that echo chambers and algorithmic filtering amplify polarization and contribute to the viral spread of disinformation, undermining the idea of rational and pluralistic public discourse [Törnberg, 2018]. At the same time, the very structure of social networks creates conditions for self-isolation and the strengthening of radical positions. If these network effects were less pronounced, one could expect a more balanced and critical political dialogue. A counter-argument is Habermas's position, who saw the potential in digital media for expanding the public sphere and democratic participation, but acknowledged that in practice these opportunities are realized with difficulty and are accompanied by new forms of stratification and inequality [Habermas, 1991]. This indicates that technological changes themselves do not guarantee democratization but require conscious political management.

The third limitation concerns the theoretical uncertainty surrounding the concept of subjectivity and identity in postmodernity. On the one hand, authors like Ahponen and Baudrillard emphasize a break with the traditional foundations of the subject, leading to its fragmentation and loss of integrity [Ahponen, 1990; Baudrillard, 2018]. On the other hand, researchers such as Chodorow and Felski point to the transformation, rather than destruction, of the subject, emphasizing the multiplicity and historical contextuality of identities [Chodorow, 2005; Felski, 2002]. This uncertainty complicates the application of postmodern concepts to the empirical analysis of political processes, as it is unclear how exactly multiple identities consolidate or conflict in real politics. The question remains open: how can the multiplicity of identities become a basis for political solidarity, and not just for fragmentation and conflicts?

Finally, the critique concerns the very idea of postmodernity as an era or cultural logic. Some researchers, such as Koschorke and co-authors, point out that many postmodern ideas become viral in new political conditions, giving rise to phenomena of post-truth and populism that are difficult to explain by classical theories [Koschorke et al., 2019]. This calls into question the relevance and adequacy of postmodern theories for understanding contemporary political culture. If postmodernity no longer describes current processes, then there is a need for new conceptual tools capable of accounting for the dynamics of post-postmodernity and the digital age. The main limitations of the postmodern approach to political culture are related to its tendency towards fragmentation, difficulties in analyzing digital media, and uncertainty in understanding subjectivity. This changes the conclusions: without considering these problems, postmodern theories risk overestimating pluralism and underestimating the challenges of political mobilization and integration. The question remains open as to how political fragmentation can be overcome while preserving pluralism, and what new forms of political subjectivity and communication can ensure the stability of democratic institutions in the digital age. This question is difficult to answer, as it requires an interdisciplinary approach combining cultural studies, political science, sociology, and media theory, as well as empirical research capable of tracking complex network and discursive processes in real time.

Conclusion

• Contemporary political culture demonstrates fragmentation and a pluralism of values, reflecting a rejection of universal ideological systems and generating multiple, often conflicting political narratives [Jameson, 1991].

• Postmodernity in politics manifests through the deconstruction of traditional ideologies and narratives, leading to flexibility and multiplicity of political identity, blurring previous boundaries of subjectivity [Frie, 2003; Chodorow, 2005].

• Media act not merely as channels for transmitting information, but as active participants in shaping political culture, creating spaces of simulation and hyperreality where objective truth is undermined and replaced by a multiplicity of interpretations [Baudrillard, 2018; Fiske, 1990].

• Postmodern skepticism contributes to the growth of political apathy and cynicism, as traditional institutions and their legitimation are questioned, complicating the formation of stable political subjectivity [Frie, 2003].

• At the same time, postmodernity stimulates the development of new forms of political activism and protests based on networked communications, irony, and parody, which changes political rhetoric and ways of legitimizing power [Törnberg, 2018; Jameson, 1991].

• Contemporary political culture reflects the conflict between globalization and local identities, where digital media amplify processes of self-isolation and tribalization, complicating the creation of a common political space [Lynch, 2005; Törnberg, 2018].

• The transformation of power in postmodern society is associated with a shift from centralized institutions to flexible, distributed networks, where legitimation occurs through discursive practices and symbolic forms, rather than through traditional structures [Harvey, 1991; Scherer & Palazzo, 2010].

• Postmodernity questions traditional institutions and their role in politics, generating new forms of integration and political responsibility, including through the participation of non-state actors, which requires a rethinking of classical notions of power and legitimation [Foucault; Scherer & Palazzo, 2010].

• The question of the fate of ideology in postmodernity remains controversial: on the one hand, it is blurred and transformed into simulacra and superficial signs; on the other, it retains the ability to influence unconscious structures and social practices, masking itself in new forms [Baudrillard, 2018; Zizek, 1990; Frie, 2003].

• How postmodernity affects political culture and subjectivity remains an open question, especially in the context of the digital age, where the spread of disinformation and polarization become structural effects of social networks and media logic [Törnberg, 2018].

• Finally, it remains unresolved how, in conditions of fragmentation, multiplicity of identities, and new forms of power, it is possible to form stable political subjectivity and collective projects capable of resisting political apathy and cynicism?