Modern Philosophical Systems and Religious Phenomena

Introduction

Contemporary philosophy, despite the apparent secularization of thought, continues to actively engage with religious phenomena, offering diverse approaches to their understanding. This interaction is not limited to critique or apologetics but includes a deep analysis of the structure of religious experience, language, social functions, and the cognitive foundations of faith. The philosophical framework within which this dialogue unfolds encompasses a wide range of traditions, from phenomenology to analytic philosophy, each bringing its unique tools and perspectives. For example, Edmund Husserl [Husserl, 1900] laid the foundations of the phenomenological method, which allows the study of religious experience without reducing it to psychological or sociological factors, aiming instead at the immediate description of its essence. At the same time, existentialists such as Søren Kierkegaard viewed religion as a fundamental human choice in the face of the absurdity of existence, as a "leap of faith" that defies rational justification.

These fundamental ideas form the basis for understanding how modern philosophical systems approach religious phenomena. On the one hand, we see a striving for rigorous analysis and deconstruction characteristic of postmodernism and analytic philosophy, where religious narratives and arguments undergo thorough logical and linguistic scrutiny. On the other hand, there remains an interest in subjective experience and the search for meaning, manifested in phenomenological and existential traditions. Charles Taylor [Taylor et al., 1990], in his work "Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity," explores how secularization has influenced the formation of modern self-understanding and religion, emphasizing the complexity and multifaceted nature of this process. Modern philosophical systems do not simply reject or accept religion but actively reinterpret its role and significance in the context of a changing world, offering new conceptual frameworks for its study.

Detailed Exposition

The Influence of Postmodernism on Religious Experience and Identity

Postmodernism, with its skepticism toward universal truths and metanarratives, might have been expected to undermine the foundations of religious experience definitively. However, instead, we observe a paradoxical phenomenon: religion does not disappear but transforms, acquiring new forms and meanings in a fragmented world. How does postmodernism, proclaiming the end of grand narratives, affect deeply rooted religious narratives and the personal identity of believers?

One key aspect of this influence is the redefinition of identity. In a world homogenized by modernization processes, postmodernism advocates the rejection of rigid categories and calls for a rethinking of the self. Ahmad Sidqi notes that "the new Islamic experience includes the redefinition of identity in a world homogenized by the globalizing process of modernism" [Sidqi, 2018]. This is not merely adaptation but an active assertion of the need to reject uniformity in cultural and social spheres, calling for more active participation in political life. Islamic movements, in his view, represent a "fundamental act of rebellion against the alienating experience" resulting from the inclusion of the Arab world in a global system dominated by modernism and its institutions [Sidqi, 2018]. Postmodernism, rather than weakening religious identity, paradoxically may contribute to its strengthening through resistance to unification.

However, this resistance does not always mean a return to traditional forms. Often, postmodern religious thought is characterized by a "separation of religious faith from religious experience," with a tendency to "emphasize the latter at the expense of the former" [Harrison, 2009]. This means that for many believers, the focus shifts from dogmatic assertions and institutional structures to personal, subjective experiences of the transcendent. Religious experience becomes more individualized, less tied to rigid doctrines. Lieven Boeve describes this as "religious bungee jumping," where youth seek thrills and experiences of transcendence in postmodern culture without necessarily adhering to traditional forms of faith [Boeve, 1999]. This can lead to a crisis of spirituality, as some researchers note, since "the three main historical periods—traditional, modern, and postmodern—have brought us to our current spiritual crisis."

Postmodernism also questions the authority of traditional religious institutions and their monopoly on truth. If there is no single metanarrative, then there is no single, universally recognized interpretation of sacred texts or religious experience. This opens space for multiple interpretations and the deconstruction of established meanings. Sidqi points out that in the contemporary Islamic world, "new practices begin to orient social relations in areas of modern education, organized religion, and governmental expertise" [Sidqi, 2018]. These practices, while creating an appearance of structure and meaning, are often far removed from people's everyday lives and have no direct relation to them. In response, "miniature," "popular" procedures arise that undermine the pervasive mechanism of control. For example, women wearing modest clothing becomes not only an expression of Islamic behavior but also a form of resistance to dominant Western models [Sidqi, 2018]. This demonstrates how religious identity can be reinterpreted and expressed under the challenge of postmodernism.

In this context, even prisons can become "the best schools or universities of political training" for Muslim activists, where they receive basic religious education and undergo conversion to the "new Islam" [Sidqi, 2018]. This emphasizes that religious experience in the postmodern era can be shaped in conditions of resistance and the search for alternative forms of existence, not only within traditional institutions.

However, not everyone sees postmodernism solely as a challenge. Some researchers, such as M. Johanna Lauterbach, attempt to actualize classical phenomenology of religion to explain religious experience to interested agnostics in secular terms [Lauterbach, 2016]. She explores "feelings with the authority of unconditional seriousness," through which Hermann Schmitz, founder of the New Phenomenology, describes the affective experience of the divine. This is an attempt to find points of contact between religious experience and modern scientific discourse without reducing the former to the latter. Postmodernism does not destroy religion but rather forces it to rethink its foundations, forms, and manifestations. It stimulates the search for new forms of identity, which can be both a reaction to globalization and an attempt to find a more authentic, personal religious experience. This process, in turn, raises questions about how we can understand and classify this diversity of religious manifestations, leading us to the epistemological problems of religious diversity.

Epistemology of Religious Diversity

If postmodernism, as discussed earlier, deconstructs universal narratives and questions a single, objective truth, this inevitably leads us to the question: what about religious experience and beliefs in conditions where many seemingly equal truths exist? Religious diversity becomes not just a sociological fact but a serious epistemological challenge for anyone trying to understand the nature of religious beliefs [Dastmalchian, 2013]. If different religions offer diametrically opposed claims about reality, the divine, and salvation, how can we assess their truth or justification?

This challenge is especially acute in the philosophy of religion, which traditionally sought to find rational grounds for faith or, conversely, for its refutation. However, in conditions of postmodern fragmentation and recognition of multiple perspectives, the task becomes more complex. Can one assert that one religion is true and others false if all are products of cultural and historical contexts? Or are they all merely "human responses to the transcendent," as John Hick suggests, proposing a pluralistic interpretation [Byrne, 2005]?

One of the most influential responses to this epistemological challenge has been the development of so-called "analytic philosophy of religion." Its representatives, such as Alvin Plantinga, sought to defend Christian beliefs using rigorous logical and epistemological methods. Plantinga, for example, argues that the problem of religious diversity often arises from too low a standard of justification applied to religious beliefs [Dastmalchian, 2013]. He introduces the concept of warrant (justification or guarantee), which differs from the traditional notion of justification. For Plantinga, belief can be warranted even if the believer lacks explicit arguments or evidence in its favor, provided it is properly formed, i.e., through cognitive faculties given by God. This is essentially an attempt to shift the burden of proof from the believer to the very structure of cognition.

However, this approach does not entirely resolve the problem. If belief in the Christian God can be warranted, what about belief in Allah or Brahman? Can these beliefs also be "properly formed" within other cognitive systems? Here arises the question of how universal these cognitive mechanisms are and whether they themselves are culturally conditioned. If we acknowledge that different religious traditions offer their own epistemological frameworks, how can we compare them without appealing to some meta-framework that may itself be problematic?

Another approach to the epistemology of religious diversity advocates recognizing other religions as alternative paths to salvation. Kenneth D’Costa, for example, calls for a change in attitude, asserting that "world religions should be taken seriously, and this means recognizing them as alternative paths to salvation, possibly no worse and no better than Christianity" [D’Costa, 1990]. This inclusivist approach, while more tolerant, also faces difficulties. If all paths lead to the same salvation, what then is the uniqueness of each religion? And what about doctrinal differences that seem irreconcilable?

Contemporary research in experimental philosophy of religion attempts to approach these questions from another angle, using tools from the humanities, particularly psychology and cognitive science [Church, 2024]. Instead of focusing exclusively on logical arguments, they study how religious beliefs are formed, what cognitive mechanisms underlie them, and how cultural context influences their perception. This allows, for example, the study of universal aspects of religious experience common to different traditions, as well as specific features conditioned by particular cultures.

However, difficulties also arise here. Reductionist explanations of religious phenomena, reducing them to cognitive "errors" or evolutionary adaptations, often provoke criticism from theologians and philosophers of religion who see this as an attempt to devalue religious experience. As M. Johanna Lauterbach notes, it is important to find a way to explain religious experience "to interested agnostics in secular terms" without reducing it to purely functional or psychological explanations [Lauterbach, 2016]. She calls for a renewal of classical phenomenology of religion to account for the "ontological distinctiveness of religious inner perspectives."

In the context of postmodernism, where identity becomes increasingly fluid and fragmented, religious experience also undergoes changes. Ahmad Sidqi notes that the Islamic experience in the postmodern world often becomes "a call for emancipatory politics" aimed at justice and more egalitarian wealth distribution [Sidqi, 2018]. This shows how religious movements can become forms of resistance to globalization and homogenization, offering redefinition of identity and active participation in the political sphere. In this sense, religious diversity is not just a set of doctrines but a dynamic process of identity formation and social action.

The problem, however, is that these "new Islamic movements" often face internal contradictions, trying to reconcile traditional values with modern demands for democracy and human rights. Sidqi points out the absence in contemporary Islamic literature of formulations similar to John Rawls' theory of justice or awareness of the rich political and philosophical critique developed in the West [Sidqi, 2018]. This highlights that dialogue between different religious and philosophical traditions, especially in globalization conditions, is a complex process where traditional and modern values collide and integrate [Grassie, 2025]. The epistemology of religious diversity forces us to go beyond simple dichotomies of "truth/falsehood" and consider more complex questions: how different religious traditions construct knowledge, how they justify their beliefs, and how these processes affect identity formation and social action. This is not just an academic issue but a deeply practical one, as it touches on the possibility of coexistence of different worldviews in a single public space. And this question about the role of religion in the public sphere and secularization becomes the next step in our reasoning.

The Role of Religion in the Public Sphere and Secularization

If in the previous section we discussed the epistemological challenges posed by religious diversity, now it is worth turning to how religion manifests itself in the public space and what happens to its role under secularization. After all, the question is not only how we know religious experience but also how this experience shapes social reality and how reality, in turn, transforms religion.

Historically, religion was an integral part of the public sphere. For most of human history, societies and states were formed in inseparable connection with religious conceptions [Mendieta, 2013]. This is not just an observation but a fundamental characteristic of the pre-modern world, where the sacred and the profane, the spiritual and the political were often indistinguishable. However, with the advent of modernity and the development of capitalism, and then democracy, there arose a need to differentiate these spheres. Jürgen Habermas, for example, in his early works insisted on the necessity of separating religious and political spheres from the public one, which, in his view, allowed overcoming the "representative" culture with its authoritarian tendencies [Mendieta, 2013]. The idea was that rational discourse in the public sphere requires neutrality, free from dogmatic or authoritative claims often associated with religion.

However, this differentiation does not mean the complete disappearance of religion from the public space. Rather, the forms of its presence and interaction with society change. In the postmodern context, we observe the strengthening of individualized forms of religiosity, often detached from traditional institutionalized structures [Bognár, 2024]. This phenomenon can be called "religious bungee jumping," where young people seek transcendent experience but not necessarily within established denominations [Boeve, 1999]. Religion becomes more flexible, adaptive, sometimes even fragmented, allowing it to remain relevant when traditional institutions lose their monopoly on truth and meaning.

At the same time, despite secularization trends, religion continues to play a significant role in identity formation and social action, especially in non-Western contexts. Ahmad Sidqi, studying the Islamic experience in the postmodern, notes that new Islamic movements, for example in the Arab world, represent a fundamental act of rebellion against the alienating experience caused by the inclusion of the Arab world in a global system dominated by modernism and its institutions [Sidqi, 2018]. This rebellion, in his view, takes large masses of people out of the modern consumer market and poses a serious challenge to the modern apparatus of control and surveillance. Here religion acts not as a passive object of secularization but as an active subject offering alternative models of identity and social organization.

Sidqi emphasizes that at the core of the new Islamic experience lies the redefinition of identity in a world homogenized by globalization processes of modernism [Sidqi, 2018]. This is simultaneously an assertion of the need to reject diversity in cultural and social spheres of life and a call for more active participation in the political sphere. The Islamic experience becomes a call for emancipatory politics, meaning justice where it is absent, more egalitarian wealth distribution, and a more democratic decision-making system [Sidqi, 2018]. This shows that religion can be a powerful driver of social change, not only a conservative force.

However, as Sidqi notes, theoretical work in this direction is still pending. For example, contemporary Islamic literature lacks formulations similar to John Rawls' theory of justice or even awareness of the rich political and philosophical critique developed in the West [Sidqi, 2018]. This points to a certain gap between the practical manifestation of religiosity in the public sphere and its theoretical understanding, which in turn creates space for further philosophical research.

At the same time, in the Western context, discussions about the role of religion in the public sphere often focus on its capacity for dialogue with secular reason. Johanna Lauterbach, inspired by Jürgen Habermas' dialogues between religion and philosophy, asks how religious people can explain to interested agnostics in secular terms what religious experience is [Lauterbach, 2016]. This striving for translation, for finding a common language, reflects an attempt to integrate the religious perspective into a broader public discourse without resorting to dogmatic assertions.

Globalization undoubtedly intensifies this interaction, confrontation, and mixing of cultures, religions, and philosophical ideas [Grassie, 2025]. Dialogue between traditional religious thought and modern philosophical trends becomes an important perspective for understanding transformations in contemporary society. Religion and philosophy, through cross-cultural dialogue, contribute to the transformation of values worldwide, which is of great significance for the modern global society [Grassie, 2025]. Secularization does not lead to the complete disappearance of religion but rather to changes in its forms and modes of manifestation. Religion continues to be a source of identity, moral values, and even political action, but its interaction with the public sphere becomes more complex and multifaceted. It can be both a force of resistance to globalization and a participant in dialogue, striving to explain its experience in secular terms. The open question remains how successfully these various forms of religiosity can integrate into the public sphere without losing their specificity and without violating the principles of pluralism. And here we inevitably approach how analytic philosophy can help clarify these complex interrelations, which will be the subject of our next discussion.

The Interrelation of Analytic Philosophy and Theology

In the previous section, we discussed how religion manifests itself in the public sphere and how secularization affects its role. Now it is worth asking how philosophy itself, particularly its analytic branch, interacts with theology, and whether a fruitful dialogue between them is possible. After all, if religion seeks to reclaim its place in public discourse, it inevitably must confront the rational and logical demands posed by modern thought.

For a long time, analytic philosophy, with its emphasis on clarity, precision, and logical analysis of language, seemed distant from theological questions, which often operate with concepts beyond empirical verification. However, as some researchers note, "the flourishing of philosophical theology became possible thanks to analytic philosophers' rejection of certain assumptions characteristic of modern philosophy and the emergence of a new understanding of philosophy's task and role in culture" [Wolterstorff, 2009]. This means that analytic philosophy, overcoming its early positivist limitations, began to recognize the legitimacy of questions related to metaphysics and religion, offering its rigorous methods for their study.

Nevertheless, not everyone agrees that the analytic approach is a universal tool for theology. For example, Eleonore Stump criticizes analytic philosophy for its "hemianopsia"—a narrow focus on information-processing skills associated with the left hemisphere of the brain [Stump, 2009]. In her view, this leads to ignoring important sources of information, such as narrative, which plays a central role in religious experience and theological understanding. Religious stories, parables, personal testimonies—all these do not lend themselves to simple logical analysis but are an integral part of faith. How can one reduce the experience of a miracle or a personal encounter with the transcendent to logical formulas?

Here arises an important question about the distinction between analytic theology and philosophy of religion. Max Baker-Hytch asks: "Is analytic theology simply a subdivision of analytic philosophy of religion, or can it be distinguished from the latter due to fundamental differences at the level of subject matter or methodology?" [Baker-Hytch, 2016]. Philosophy of religion traditionally deals with general questions about the nature of religion, its epistemological status, arguments for and against the existence of God, using a neutral, external position. Analytic theology, on the other hand, works from within a specific religious tradition, seeking to clarify and systematize its doctrines using analytic tools. It does not question faith itself but aims to make it more coherent and rationally justified for those who already share it.

This distinction becomes especially apparent when we consider how analytic methods are applied to specific religious texts or concepts. If philosophy of religion can analyze, for example, the concept of evil in general, analytic theology will study how this concept is presented in Christianity, Islam, or Judaism, and how it aligns with other doctrines of that tradition. Analytic theology does not merely apply philosophical tools to religious questions but does so with a certain internal commitment, which distinguishes it from the more detached philosophy of religion.

However, even with this approach, analytic theology faces challenges. For example, what about those aspects of religious experience that are by nature irrational or paradoxical? Søren Kierkegaard spoke of the "leap of faith" as a fundamental existential choice that cannot be reduced to rational arguments. Can analytic theology adequately comprehend such phenomena, or will it inevitably reduce them, losing their essence?

Ian Church introduces the concept of "experimental philosophy of religion," which uses tools from the humanities, especially psychology and cognitive science, to study questions in philosophy of religion [Church, 2024]. This direction, although not analytic theology in the strict sense, shows how empirical data can be used to understand religious beliefs. However, as Church notes, it is important to remember that "experimental philosophy of religion" has deep historical roots, and its goal is not to replace theology but to complement it by offering new perspectives.

In the context of globalization, where different cultures and religions increasingly interact, dialogue between religion and philosophy becomes even more relevant. Tawny Grassie notes that "in the context of globalization, dialogue between traditional religious thought and modern philosophical trends has become an important perspective for understanding transformations in contemporary society" [Grassie, 2025]. This dialogue can contribute not only to confrontation but also to the integration of traditional and modern values, which is especially important for understanding religious experience in the postmodern context.

Ahmad Sidqi, studying Islamic religious experience in the postmodern, emphasizes that contemporary Islamic movements often represent a "fundamental act of rebellion against the alienating experience resulting from the inclusion of the Arab world in a global system dominated by modernism and its institutions" [Sidqi, 2018]. He points out that these movements seek to redefine identity in a world homogenized by globalization and call for more active participation in the political sphere. Here analytic philosophy could offer tools to clarify concepts of justice, equality, and participation underlying these movements, which, according to Sidqi, have not yet received adequate theoretical development in contemporary Islamic literature [Sidqi, 2018]. The interrelation of analytic philosophy and theology is not merely an academic interest but a living and developing dialogue that can help theology articulate its positions more clearly in the modern world and philosophy expand its horizons by recognizing the complexity and multifaceted nature of religious experience. However, the question remains open: how deeply can analytic methods penetrate the essence of religious revelation without distorting it, and is rational analysis itself only one way of apprehending truth, not the only one?

The Relationship Between Reason and Revelation in Religious Epistemology

In the previous section, we discussed how analytic philosophy, with its rigor and attention to logic, approaches theological questions, seeking to clarify their conceptual basis. However, when it comes to religious epistemology, a fundamental question inevitably arises: what is the relationship between reason and revelation? Are they mutually exclusive paths of knowledge, or can they harmoniously complement each other, offering a fuller understanding of the transcendent? This question is not merely academic; it touches the very essence of religious experience and the justification of faith.

Historically, many religious traditions have tried to reconcile these two sources of knowledge. For example, in Islamic thought, as noted by Alsuhaymi, Ibn Taymiyyah proposes a triadic epistemological model centered on revelation (naql), reason (‘aql), and innate disposition (fitra). He does not completely reject reason but redefines its role: reason becomes an instrument, not the supreme judge. Fitra acts as an intuitive basis for faith, a kind of internal compass pointing to truth. Revelation does not suppress reason but guides it, providing frameworks for interpretation and understanding of the world.

However, not all thinkers are so optimistic about harmony. Some see revelation as something that transcends or even contradicts rational knowledge. Søren Kierkegaard, for example, in his work "Fear and Trembling," speaks of the "leap of faith" as an existential choice that cannot be fully justified by reason. For him, faith is not the result of logical conclusions but rather an act of will, a personal decision requiring the renunciation of rational guarantees. This approach emphasizes the irrational or supra-rational aspect of religious experience, where personal experience and subjective conviction play a key role.

On the other hand, analytic philosophy of religion, as discussed earlier, often seeks rational grounds for religious beliefs. Richard Swinburne, for example, in his book "The Existence of God," uses probabilistic arguments to show that the existence of God is the most probable explanation of observed phenomena. Here reason acts as the primary tool for evaluating religious claims, and revelation, if accepted, must be compatible with logic and empirical data. This creates tension between those who see faith as something to be rationally justified and those who believe its nature lies beyond pure reason.

Interestingly, religious beliefs can be justified not only intellectually but also through moral experience. John Henry Newman, in his "Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent," argues that religion and ethics are interconnected, and religious faith can be rooted in our moral experience [Wynn, 2005]. This means that not only logical arguments or direct revelation but also an inner sense of right and wrong, a striving for justice and goodness can serve as a basis for religious beliefs. Such an approach broadens the understanding of sources of religious knowledge, including cognitive as well as affective and ethical aspects.

In the context of postmodernism, which we have already touched upon, traditional narratives, including religious ones, undergo deconstruction, leading to multiplicity of interpretations. This calls into question the universality and objectivity of both rational and revelatory truths. If all truths are relative and context-dependent, how can one speak of a single revelation or a universal reason capable of apprehending it? Ahmad Sidqi notes that in the postmodern context, the Islamic experience can be reinterpreted as a call for emancipatory politics, where justice and equality become central themes. This shows how religious concepts can be reinterpreted in light of modern philosophical challenges, shifting the emphasis from dogmatic to socio-ethical.

Contemporary research in experimental philosophy of religion also contributes to this discussion. Ian Church points out that this field uses tools from psychology and cognitive science to study questions in philosophy of religion. For example, it can investigate how human cognitive mechanisms influence the formation of religious beliefs or how cultural context shapes the perception of revelation. This allows viewing the relationship between reason and revelation from a new empirical perspective, studying not only what people believe but also how they come to these beliefs.

However, despite all attempts at rationalization and empirical analysis, the question remains whether reason can fully encompass or explain the transcendent. Lieven Boeve introduces the concept of "religious bungee jumping" to describe the experience of transcendence in postmodern culture, implying that it may be something beyond ordinary understanding requiring a certain "leap" or risk. This resonates with Kierkegaard's ideas but in a modern context where traditional supports are weakened. The relationship between reason and revelation remains a dynamic and multifaceted field of inquiry. From attempts at harmonization in Islamic thought, where reason serves as an instrument for understanding revelation [Alsuhaymi et al., 2025], to Kierkegaard's existential "leap of faith," to analytic attempts at rational justification of religious beliefs, as well as moral justification of faith [Wynn, 2005]—all these approaches demonstrate the complexity and ambiguity of this problem. In conditions of globalization and intercultural dialogue, as noted by Tawny Grassie, religion and philosophy continue to interact, confront, and blend, requiring constant rethinking of traditional categories.

Ultimately, the question is not so much which is more important—reason or revelation—but how they interact and form a holistic religious experience. Can reason, even the most sophisticated, ever fully grasp what by definition lies beyond its limits, or will revelation always require an act of faith that defies complete rational explanation? This unresolved question leads us to the need for critical reflection on both methods of knowledge and the limits of human understanding, which will be the subject of our further discussion.

Criticism and Limitations

The Limitations of the Analytic Approach to Religious Experience

Analytic philosophy, despite its rigor and striving for clarity, faces fundamental limitations when studying religious phenomena. Its emphasis on logical analysis of language and arguments, while useful for clarifying doctrines, often overlooks nonverbal, intuitive, and emotional aspects of religious experience. Eleonore Stump criticizes analytic philosophy for "hemianopsia"—a narrow focus on "information-processing skills associated with the left hemisphere of the brain," leading to the neglect of "important sources of information, one of which is narrative" [Stump, 2009]. If the analytic approach were more open to narrative forms of knowledge, it could more deeply understand how religious stories and personal testimonies shape faith and worldview, instead of reducing them to propositional statements. Without considering these aspects, the conclusions of analytic philosophy of religion may be incomplete, describing only the rational shell of faith but not its living content.

Reductionism in the Cognitive Science of Religion

The cognitive science of religion, aiming to explain religious beliefs through universal cognitive mechanisms, risks falling into reductionism. Explaining faith as a product of evolutionary adaptations or cognitive "errors" can devalue religious experience by reducing it to purely biological or psychological processes. If cognitive science of religion acknowledged that its explanations concern mechanisms of belief formation rather than its truth or value, this could avoid accusations of reductionism. However, when it claims to fully explain religious phenomena, it ignores transcendent and metaphysical dimensions central to many believers. This creates a methodological gap between scientific explanation of "how" and the philosophical question of "why," leaving unanswered whether empirical research can ever fully encompass a phenomenon that by nature strives to transcend the empirical.

The Limitations of the Western Perspective in the Study of Religious Experience

Most contemporary philosophical systems discussed in the context of religious phenomena have developed within the Western academic tradition, inevitably imposing certain limitations on their universality. For example, concepts of secularization and the public sphere developed by Jürgen Habermas [Mendieta, 2013], or epistemological approaches of Alvin Plantinga [Dastmalchian, 2013], are deeply rooted in European intellectual heritage. This can lead to inadequate interpretation or even neglect of non-Western religious phenomena, such as the Islamic experience in the postmodern described by Ahmad Sidqi. Sidqi explicitly points to the absence in contemporary Islamic literature of formulations similar to John Rawls' theory of justice or awareness of the rich political and philosophical critique developed in the West [Sidqi, 2018]. This does not imply the inferiority of non-Western traditions but rather indicates the need for broader intercultural dialogue and the development of philosophical tools capable of adequately understanding the diversity of religious experiences without imposing Western categories. The open question remains how to create a truly global philosophy of religion that is not merely an extrapolation of Western ideas onto other cultures but results from a genuine synthesis of various intellectual traditions.

Conclusions

• Contemporary philosophical systems offer diverse, often contradictory, approaches to religious phenomena, reflecting the complexity and multifaceted nature of the subject itself.
• Phenomenology strives for a non-reductive description of religious experience, whereas analytic philosophy focuses on logical analysis of religious language and arguments.
• Postmodernism, by deconstructing traditional religious narratives, paradoxically contributes to the reinterpretation of religious identity and the emergence of new forms of religious experience, often individualized and emancipatory.
• The epistemology of religious diversity questions the universality of religious truths, forcing philosophers to seek new ways to justify faith or recognize multiple paths to the transcendent.
• Secularization does not lead to the disappearance of religion from the public sphere but rather transforms its role, making it a source of identity, moral values, and even political action, requiring ongoing dialogue between religious and secular perspectives.
• The interrelation of reason and revelation remains a central problem of religious epistemology, where different traditions propose their models of harmonization or, conversely, emphasize their fundamental difference.
• How to reconcile the pursuit of rational clarity in philosophy with the irrational or supra-rational aspects of religious experience without reducing one to the other remains an open question.