Contemporary Continental Philosophers on Hell and Heaven

Introduction

In the philosophical tradition of continental Europe, the concepts of hell and heaven have long transcended strictly religious dogmas and have acquired the status of metaphors reflecting fundamental aspects of human existence. Already in 20th-century existentialism, represented by figures such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger, hell and heaven cease to be literal places of postmortem retribution and become symbols of existential states of alienation and authenticity. Sartre, for example, in his famous statement "hell is other people," emphasizes the social and subjective character of hell as the impossibility of escaping the gaze and judgment of the other. Heidegger, on the contrary, associates heaven with the state of being-in-the-world when a person attains fullness and authenticity of existence [Heidegger, 1927].

Phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches developed in continental philosophy allow hell and heaven to be considered as symbols of inner experience rather than merely metaphysical realities. Jacques Derrida, through the deconstruction of binary oppositions, dismantles traditional notions of good and evil, heaven and hell, revealing their interdependence and continuity. Slavoj Žižek, in turn, uses these categories to critique Christian heritage and analyze ideological structures, uncovering paradoxes and hidden mechanisms of power.

Contemporary continental philosophers also pay attention to the socio-political context of the concepts of hell and heaven. Michel Foucault considers them as metaphors of disciplinary practices and biopower, where hell symbolizes repressive structures, and heaven idealized spaces of control and normalization. Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari offer an interpretation of heaven as a space of multiplicity and creativity, opposing it to hell — structures of repression and monotony.

Questions of freedom, responsibility, and ethical choice are closely intertwined with the philosophy of hell and heaven, making these concepts relevant for analyzing human subjectivity and social relations. Hell and heaven serve not only as metaphors of inner states but also as critiques of existing social orders, revealing conflicts of identity, recognition, and alienation [Goff et al., 2012]. Contemporary continental philosophy offers a multifaceted understanding of hell and heaven that goes beyond traditional theology and addresses questions of being, ethics, and politics. The focus is less on dogmatic content and more on the phenomenology of experience, social dynamics, and the deconstruction of cultural meanings. This lecture will explore how key contemporary thinkers of the continental tradition interpret hell and heaven, revealing their philosophical potential and critical power.

Detailed Exposition

Possibility and Limits of Religious Experience in Continental Philosophy

How can hell and heaven be understood outside traditional religious discourse? This question challenges familiar notions, proposing to consider them not as literal places but as metaphors of existential states. Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, in his famous aphorism "hell is other people," shows that hell is not fiery torment but the impossibility of escaping the gaze of the other, constant alienation, and loss of freedom in the presence of another consciousness. This perspective shifts hell into the realm of intersubjective relations, where suffering arises from the impossibility of communication and mutual understanding.

Martin Heidegger, in turn, associates heaven with the state of authentic being-in-the-world, when the subject achieves harmony with itself and the surrounding world, overcoming alienation and oblivion of being [Heidegger, 1927]. Heaven here is not a utopian ideal but a phenomenological experience of fullness of existence, when a person becomes aware of their finitude and responsibility, accepting freedom as a fundamental condition of being. This understanding raises the question of the limits of subjectivity and its capacity for self-transcendence.

Jacques Derrida offers a deconstructive approach that dismantles the binary oppositions "hell — heaven," "good — evil," "holiness — sin" as fixed categories. He shows that these concepts interpenetrate and cannot exist without each other, that hell and heaven are not opposites but interconnected moments of a single process of self-definition and self-negation. His concept of différance requires rethinking the impossible and the impossibility of full presence, which is reflected in religious experience as a constant movement toward an impossible ideal that is never reached but always directs the subject.

Michel Foucault considers hell and heaven as metaphors of disciplinary and biopolitical practices, where hell is a space of control, punishment, and alienation, and heaven is the ideal of normalization and harmonization of body and soul within social institutions. His analysis shows that these categories are not only religious but also political, reflecting mechanisms of power that shape subjectivity and social relations. Hell in this sense is not only an inner state but also an external structure imposing alienation.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari offer a radically different view, interpreting heaven as a space of multiplicity, creativity, and becoming, and hell as repressive structures hindering the free flow of desires and life. Their philosophy emphasizes that heaven is not a static state but a process of constant becoming and resistance, while hell is stagnation, repression, and monotony. This perspective expands traditional notions by linking hell and heaven with social and cultural contexts.

Slavoj Žižek, relying on the Christian tradition, sees internal contradictions in the Christian experience that make hell and heaven not just places but dynamic processes within God and man himself. He argues that Christ is a rupture that simultaneously separates God from God and man from man, which destroys the idea of a transcendent God and introduces the notion of internal fracture and conflict. Hell and heaven in this context are not external realities but internal states associated with betrayal, salvation, and the impossibility of complete reconciliation.

Anna Alexandrova and colleagues, analyzing Jean-Luc Nancy's project, show that religious experience and secularization are not opposed but arise from the same history characterized by self-destruction and self-foundation of Western culture. Nancy considers religion as a process of deconstruction where hell and heaven become symbols of constant tension between foundation and destruction, between faith and doubt. This emphasizes the complexity of religious experience as a phenomenon beyond traditional dogmas.

Daniel Sands in his work refers to Derrida's différance and its interpretation by Žižek, emphasizing that religious experience is connected with the impossibility of fully realizing the act of faith, which is always deferred and requires rethinking the impossible [Sands, 2008]. This means that hell and heaven are not endpoints but processes in which the subject is constantly involved in movement between the impossible and the possible, between expectation and disappointment.

In this context, hell appears as a state of alienation, impossibility of communication, and existential pain, while heaven is an ideal of authenticity, harmony, and unity with oneself and the world. These concepts are closely linked to questions of freedom and responsibility, since it is through awareness of one's freedom and acceptance of responsibility that the subject can approach the state of "heaven" or, conversely, find themselves in the "hell" of alienation.

The socio-political context intensifies these interpretations. Hell and heaven become critiques of existing social orders: hell is repressive structures of power and alienation, heaven is a space of resistance and creativity. Literary and cultural texts serve philosophers as sources for analyzing these concepts, allowing them to reveal their multilayered nature and complexity.

Phenomenological and hermeneutic approaches used by contemporary continental philosophers reveal the depth of religious experience beyond dogmatic representations. They show that hell and heaven are not only metaphors but real existential states that shape subjectivity and influence moral choice.

Ultimately, the philosophy of hell and heaven in the continental tradition is not merely theological categories but complex symbols reflecting the internal conflicts of the subject, their relations with others, the world, and themselves. These symbols open space for critique, rethinking, and transformation of both personal and social existence.

This understanding leads to the next question: if hell and heaven are not just places but philosophical constructions, what are their utopian and liminal functions in the formation of subjectivity? This will be the topic of the next section — Hell and Heaven as Philosophical Constructions: Utopia, Limbo, and the Limits of Subjectivity.

Hell and Heaven as Philosophical Constructions: Utopia, Limbo, and the Limits of Subjectivity

Moving from the discussion of religious experience to philosophical constructions of hell and heaven, it is worth noting that these concepts go beyond traditional theological dogmas. They become metaphors of existential states in which deep structures of subjectivity and being manifest. Hell and heaven in contemporary continental philosophy are not merely places of afterlife retribution but symbols of inner conflict, freedom, and responsibility.

Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, in his famous formula "hell is other people," shows that hell arises from the impossibility of escaping the gaze of the other, from alienation imposed by social presence. This gaze becomes a form of violence depriving the subject of authenticity and freedom. Hell for Sartre is not a geographical place but a state of alienation where a person becomes a prisoner of another's judgment and the impossibility of being oneself. This approach emphasizes that hell is not merely punishment but a fundamental existential situation in which the subject loses control over their being.

In contrast, heaven for Martin Heidegger appears as a state of authentic being-in-the-world. Heaven is not a utopia in the classical sense but a space where the subject achieves fullness of existence through acceptance of their mortality and responsibility. Heidegger associates heaven with the harmony of being when a person ceases to be alienated from the world and attains unity with themselves and the environment. Heaven here is not an externally imposed ideal but an inner state toward which authentic existence strives.

Jacques Derrida offers a deconstructive view of hell and heaven, dismantling the binary oppositions that traditionally separate them. He shows that these concepts do not exist as fixed categories but constantly shift within the field of différance — the process of differentiation and deferral of meaning. Derrida emphasizes that hell and heaven are constructions that simultaneously imply and destroy each other, creating space for endless reinterpretation. His analysis indicates that the concepts of hell and heaven cannot be reduced to simple metaphysical truths but require continuous hermeneutic work.

Michel Foucault considers hell and heaven as metaphors of disciplinary and biopolitical practices, where hell symbolizes repressive mechanisms of control and punishment, and heaven is an idealized space of normalization and harmonization. In his conception, hell is not so much a place of torment as a system of power that shapes the subject through punishment and surveillance. Heaven, in turn, appears as a utopia imposed by power, striving for complete regulation of life and body. This view reveals the socio-political context of the concepts of hell and heaven, showing their connection with mechanisms of power and resistance.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in "A Thousand Plateaus" propose an interpretation of heaven as a space of multiplicity, creativity, and decentralization, opposing it to hell, which they see as repressive structures and monotony. For them, heaven is not a fixed place but a process, a flow that destroys hierarchies and opens new possibilities for subjectivity. Hell, conversely, is stagnation, limitation, and suppression of diversity. Their concept emphasizes the dynamic and political nature of these notions, linking them to questions of freedom and resistance.

Interestingly, James Phillips, analyzing the concept of limbo in Giorgio Agamben, sees it as a special form of utopia that simultaneously critiques biopolitics. Limbo, according to Agamben, is a space where subjects exist outside the law and salvation but retain a certain autonomy and play. Phillips notes that for Agamben, limbo is not merely an intermediate state between hell and heaven but a particular utopia challenging traditional ideas of justice and sovereignty. This interpretation expands the philosophical understanding of hell and heaven by introducing elements of political theory and critique of power.

Edoardo Canzian, in a review of philosophical approaches to Camus, emphasizes that the concepts of hell and heaven in contemporary philosophy are closely linked to questions of responsibility and moral choice. Camus, although skeptical of systematic philosophy, leaves us a legacy of reflections on human freedom and the absurd, where hell and heaven serve as symbols of ethical dilemmas. His philosophy shows that heaven cannot be attained without accepting responsibility, and hell is not so much punishment as a consequence of refusal of freedom.

Daniel Sands, in his analysis of deconstruction in Derrida and Žižek, draws attention to the fact that the concepts of hell and heaven are connected with the problem of the "unnameable" and "absence" in language. Derrida treats these categories as effects of difference and trace that cannot be fully fixed or defined. Žižek, in turn, emphasizes that the meaning of hell and heaven is constructed retrospectively, and their significance is always related to a future that has not yet come. This adds a temporal and uncertainty dimension to the philosophy of hell and heaven, complicating traditional views of them as fixed states.

Hell and heaven in contemporary continental philosophy appear as complex philosophical constructions that simultaneously reflect the inner states of the subject and socio-political realities. They serve as critiques of existing orders and propose new ways of understanding freedom, responsibility, and authenticity. These concepts are not reducible to dogmatic definitions but require constant rethinking through the lenses of phenomenology, hermeneutics, and political theory.

The question of how hell and heaven relate to methodological approaches in philosophy of religion becomes especially relevant considering the divide between analytic and continental traditions. The next section is devoted precisely to these methodological divides that influence the interpretation of religious concepts and their philosophical understanding.

Methodological Divides: Analytic and Continental Traditions in Philosophy of Religion

Continuing reflections on how hell and heaven serve not merely as religious concepts but as metaphors of existential states, it is important to note the methodological divides between analytic and continental philosophy of religion. These two traditions differ not only in style and methods but also in their approach to fundamental questions of religious experience and its interpretation.

Continental philosophy of religion primarily tends toward critique and deconstruction of traditional concepts. Jacques Derrida, for example, through his concept of différance, shows that religious categories have no fixed meaning but constantly shift and are redefined in the process of interpretation. Danielle Sands emphasizes that for Derrida, democracy and religion are linked through the movement of difference and interval, where democracy is différance, renvoi, and spacing [Sands, 2008]. This means that religious concepts of hell and heaven cannot be understood as static truths but rather as spaces of tension and openness where meaning is constantly deferred and transformed.

In contrast, analytic philosophy of religion strives for systematization and logical clarification of religious claims. It attempts to define clear criteria of truth, justification, and semantic clarity of religious concepts. Schubert, in his 2022 work, metaphorically compares continental philosophy to graffiti — a form of communication not intended for a "law-abiding audience," whereas analytic philosophy aims for a more formalized and "lawful" discourse [Schubert et al., 2022]. This difference reflects not only style but also attitude toward religious experience: analytic philosophers seek universal foundations, while continental philosophers deconstruct and question.

Nevertheless, Şentürk in 2024 proposes a more integrative view, pointing to the possibility of dialogue and synthesis between these traditions. He analyzes the critique of metaphysics in both analytic and continental philosophy, noting that both traditions create new opportunities for philosophy of religion, especially in socio-political contexts [Şentürk et al., 2024]. This opens a perspective in which hell and heaven can be considered not only as metaphysical categories but also as social and political symbols reflecting conflicts and ideals of contemporary society.

In this vein, Michel Foucault proposes to consider hell and heaven as metaphors of disciplinary and biopolitical practices. His analysis shows that "hell" can be represented as a space of control, punishment, and alienation, while "heaven" is an ideal of harmony but simultaneously a tool of normalization and power [Foucault]. Such an approach demonstrates that philosophy of religion is inseparable from social structures and political mechanisms, bringing the continental tradition closer to critical theory.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, in turn, offer an interpretation of heaven as a space of multiplicity, creativity, and becoming, opposing it to hell, which they see as repressive structures and limitations [Deleuze and Guattari]. Their concept of multiplicity and différance resonates with Derrida's ideas but emphasizes the positive power of creativity and resistance, expanding the understanding of hell and heaven as dynamic processes rather than static states.

Jean-Paul Sartre, with his famous assertion "hell is other people," introduces an existential aspect of alienation and the impossibility of escaping the gaze of the other into philosophy of religion. This is not merely a metaphor but a description of fundamental human experience where hell arises from the impossibility of communication and mutual understanding [Sartre]. Here hell becomes a state in which the subject is deprived of freedom to be themselves, resonating with phenomenological analysis of alienation.

Martin Heidegger, conversely, associates heaven with the state of authenticity and being-in-the-world. His phenomenological approach allows understanding heaven as a space of fullness of existence where the subject attains harmony with self and world, overcoming alienation and existential anxiety [Heidegger, 1927]. This understanding of heaven as authentic being expands traditional religious meanings and translates them into the plane of existential experience.

Jacques Derrida, analyzing binary oppositions such as hell and heaven, shows that these categories do not exist in pure form but are always interconnected and interpenetrate. His deconstruction dismantles familiar boundaries, revealing that heaven contains elements of hell and hell contains elements of heaven, making them concepts constantly redefining each other [Derrida]. This complicates traditional understanding and opens space for new interpretations.

Slavoj Žižek, criticizing late Derrida, proposes his own "religious turn," in which God appears as the "supreme split" between the absolute and its manifestation, which can be interpreted as différance in a religious context [Sands, 2008]. His approach emphasizes the political and ideological function of religious images of hell and heaven, linking them to questions of justice and power.

An important addition to this discourse is the work of James Phillips, who investigates the notion of limbo in Agamben, viewing it as a space between hell and heaven where inhabitants experience "natural but not supernatural joy," which parodies both states [Phillips, 2013]. This highlights that the boundaries between hell and heaven are not only blurred but also politicized, reflecting the contemporary situation of refugees and those excluded from social orders.

Methodological divides between analytic and continental philosophy of religion manifest not only in style and methods but also in the understanding of hell and heaven as philosophical categories. The continental tradition tends toward deconstruction, social critique, and phenomenological analysis, whereas the analytic tradition leans toward systematization and logical clarification. However, contemporary research shows that synthesizing these approaches can enrich philosophy of religion, especially in the context of social and political challenges.

This perspective leads to the next important question — how do the concepts of recognition, identity, and conflict shape moral philosophy in the contemporary French tradition? After all, hell and heaven, being metaphors of alienation and harmony, are directly connected with problems of subject recognition and their place in society, requiring further philosophical reflection.

The Question of Recognition, Identity, and Conflict in Moral Philosophy: The French Perspective

Continuing the analysis of methodological divides between analytic and continental philosophy of religion, it is worth focusing on how in French moral philosophy the question of recognition becomes central to understanding identity and conflict. The theory of recognition, revived in contemporary philosophy especially in the works of Axel Honneth, offers a path to positive forms of mutual recognition but simultaneously does not conceal the complexities and threats associated with it.

Axel Honneth, one of the key representatives of recognition theory, draws inspiration from Jean-Paul Sartre but seeks to overcome some limitations of Sartrean approach. Honneth argues that conflict in recognition relations does not necessarily lead to destruction but can be resolved into stable and positive forms of mutual recognition. He sees recognition as the foundation of social justice and ethical interaction, where the subject receives confirmation of their identity through recognition by others. Honneth states that he drew inspiration from Sartre but also sought to overcome the limitations of Sartrean approach, which overlooked the possibility of resolving conflict into stable forms of mutual recognition [Goff et al., 2012].

Nevertheless, Sartre holds a more pessimistic position, emphasizing that recognition is always accompanied by the threat of reification and conflict. His famous assertion "hell is other people" reveals a fundamental problem: the gaze of the other inevitably turns the subject into an object, depriving them of freedom and authenticity. Even positive forms of recognition, according to Sartre, cannot completely escape this threat, as they always carry the potential for alienation and conflict. Sartre promised to correct the limitations of Honneth's overly optimistic description of recognition... even positive forms of recognition are inextricably linked with the threat of reification [Goff et al., 2012].

This dilemma between the possibility of mutual recognition and the inevitability of conflict reflects a broader problem of identity in moral philosophy. French thinkers such as Emmanuel Levinas offer a different view, emphasizing the ethical relation to the Other as the basis of subjectivity. Levinas argues that ethics begins with the call of the Other, which questions the autonomy and self-sufficiency of the subject. In this context, recognition becomes not so much a mutual act but an unconditional ethical demand that does not presuppose symmetry and can be a source of conflict. For Levinas, ethics is responsibility toward the Other, which does not require reciprocity, and it is this asymmetry that generates tension [Levinas, 1991].

Jacques Derrida, developing Levinas's ideas, introduces the concept of deconstruction of binary oppositions, allowing critical rethinking of traditional notions of recognition and identity. He shows that the concepts of "I" and "Other," "recognition" and "alienation" do not exist in pure form but are always in a state of differentiation and mutual penetration. Derrida emphasizes that conflict and tension are integral parts of the recognition process, and attempts to eliminate them lead to violence and exclusion. Derrida analyzes hell and heaven through the deconstruction of binary oppositions, showing that conflict and tension are inseparable from the process of recognition [Sands, 2008].

Michel Foucault, in his studies of power and discipline, considers hell and heaven as metaphors of social and political structures. Hell is a space of repressive disciplinary practices where the subject is subjected to control and alienation, while heaven is an ideal of harmony and freedom, which, however, often turns out to be an instrument of biopower and normalization. Foucault shows that moral categories of recognition and identity are inseparable from power relations, and conflict in them reflects struggles for power and resistance. Foucault considers hell and heaven as metaphors of disciplinary and biopolitical practices, where conflict is linked with power and resistance.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari offer a radically different view, interpreting heaven as a space of multiplicity, creativity, and becoming, and hell as repressive structures hindering the development of the subject. Their concept of multiplicity and flows opposes fixed identities and conflicts, proposing an ethical model based on openness and experiment. Deleuze and Guattari see heaven as a space of multiplicity and creativity, and hell as repressive structures limiting becoming.

Slavoj Žižek, criticizing both Honneth and Derrida, emphasizes that conflict in recognition cannot be fully resolved because it is connected with the fundamental structure of the subject and society. He argues that attempts to create harmony often mask suppression and exclusion, and true recognition requires acknowledgment of radical otherness and conflict. Žižek insists that conflict in recognition is irresolvable and linked to the fundamental structure of the subject [Žižek, 2003].

French moral philosophy demonstrates a complex and multifaceted understanding of recognition, identity, and conflict. Recognition is not reduced to simple mutual confirmation but is always associated with the threat of alienation, conflict, and power. At the same time, it remains a key element of ethical and political interaction, opening space for struggle and transformation.

This perspective allows us to see that questions of hell and heaven in philosophy are not merely metaphors of religious representations but symbols of deep moral and political problems related to recognition of the Other, identity, and conflict. In the next section, we will consider how these themes intersect with biology, science, and questions of the limits of the human, which will broaden the understanding of these concepts in the context of contemporary continental thought.

Hell and Heaven as Philosophical Constructions: Utopia, Limbo, and the Limits of Subjectivity

Moving from questions of recognition and identity to more fundamental existential states, contemporary continental philosophy turns to images of hell and heaven not merely as religious dogmas but as metaphors revealing the depths of human being. Hell and heaven cease to be only places of postmortem retribution and become symbols of inner experience, limits of subjectivity, and social structures. In this key, they act as philosophical constructions capable of denoting the limits of human freedom and responsibility.

Jean-Paul Sartre in "Being and Nothingness" asserted that "hell is other people," thereby designating hell as a state of impossibility to escape the gaze of the other and, consequently, alienation. This view of hell as existential pain of alienation and impossibility of communication finds continuation in the works of Michel Foucault, who considers hell and heaven as metaphors of disciplinary and biopolitical practices. Foucault shows that modern social institutions create spaces where a person finds themselves either in the position of "hell" — under constant control and suppression, or in "heaven" — in the illusion of harmony and order imposed from above.

Martin Heidegger associates heaven with the state of authenticity of being-in-the-world, when the subject attains unity with self and the surrounding world. Heaven here is not a utopia in the classical sense but an existential state in which a person becomes aware of their freedom and responsibility, overcoming alienation. However, this state is not permanent but rather a moment toward which the subject strives, balancing on the edge between being and nothingness [Heidegger, 1927].

Jacques Derrida, in turn, proposes the deconstruction of binary oppositions, including between hell and heaven. He points out that these concepts do not exist as fixed categories but are always in the movement of différance — the process of differentiation and deferral of meaning. In the text "The Force of Law," Derrida shows that justice, associated with the concept of heaven, always exceeds the law that can be measured and calculated, while hell is the inevitable side of any legal and social order where violence and exclusion become structural elements.

Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari in "A Thousand Plateaus" consider heaven as a space of multiplicity, creativity, and becoming, opposing it to hell — repressive structures that fix the subject within rigid social and psychological frameworks. Heaven for them is not a static place but a process opening new possibilities of being and resistance to homogenizing forces.

Speaking of the socio-political context, [the text here is corrupted and repeats the phrase "Speaking of the socio-political context" multiple times, indicating a possible error or placeholder in the original].

Conclusions

• Hell and heaven in contemporary continental philosophy cease to be exclusively religious concepts and act as metaphors of existential states reflecting the inner experiences of the subject and their relation to the world.

• Hell is interpreted as a state of alienation, existential pain, and the impossibility of escaping the gaze of the other, emphasizing the social and intersubjective character of suffering.

• Heaven is considered an ideal of authenticity, fullness of being, and harmony with oneself and the surrounding world, connected with acceptance of freedom and responsibility for one's own existence [Heidegger, 1927].

• Jacques Derrida's deconstructive approach dismantles the binary oppositions "hell — heaven," showing their interdependence and continuity, complicating traditional notions and opening space for reinterpretation.

• The socio-political context of hell and heaven manifests in critiques of disciplinary and biopolitical practices, where hell symbolizes repressive structures and heaven idealized spaces of control and normalization.

• The concepts of hell and heaven are closely linked with ethical dilemmas, moral choice, and questions of recognition, identity, and conflict, as reflected in contemporary French moral philosophy and recognition theory [Goff et al., 2012].

• The methodological divide between analytic and continental philosophy of religion appears in differences in approaches to religious experience: the analytic tradition seeks systematization and logical clarification, while the continental tradition leans toward critique, deconstruction, and social critique; however, dialogue and synthesis of these approaches are possible [Schubert et al., 2022].

• Hell and heaven as philosophical constructions serve not only as symbols of inner experience but also as utopias and liminal spaces reflecting the limits of subjectivity and social mechanisms of power, expanding their significance in contemporary philosophical discourse [Phillips, 2013].

• Literary and cultural texts serve as important resources for analyzing the concepts of hell and heaven, allowing philosophers to reveal their multilayered nature and connection with historical and social contexts.

• An open question requiring further philosophical reflection is how hell and heaven, being metaphors of existential and social states, can serve as instruments of transformation of the subject and society, rather than merely reflecting their alienation and idealization?