Edmund Gettier and His Contribution to Epistemology

Introduction

Epistemology, as a branch of philosophy, traditionally deals with the nature of knowledge, its origin, scope, and justification. For centuries, the central question remained the definition of what exactly constitutes knowledge. The classical Western tradition, rooted in Plato and developed by thinkers such as John Locke [Locke, 1689] and David Hume [Hume, 1739], considered knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) [Antognazza, 2014]. This tripartite concept, according to which a subject knows a proposition if it is true, the subject believes it, and the belief is justified, seemed intuitively convincing and sufficiently comprehensive. It formed the basis for understanding how we acquire and confirm our beliefs and served as a starting point for most epistemological discussions.

However, in the mid-20th century, this established paradigm faced an unexpected and powerful challenge. In 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short article "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" [Gettier, 1963], which, according to Maria Rosa Antognazza, "single-handedly changed the course of epistemology" [Antognazza, 2014]. Gettier presented counterexamples demonstrating that even when all three conditions—truth, belief, and justification—are met, the subject may not possess knowledge. These "Gettier cases" revealed a fundamental gap between justification and truth, calling into question the adequacy of the classical definition and provoking intense debates that continue to this day. The Gettier problem became, as Timofey Demin notes, the most prominent problem in analytic epistemology in the 20th century [Demin, 2019].

Detailed Exposition

Is Knowledge Justified True Belief?

For millennia, philosophers following Plato considered knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). This concept, seemingly intuitive and robust, assumed that for something to be considered knowledge, it must be true, believed, and that belief must be supported by sufficient grounds. However, in 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short but revolutionary article "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?" [Gettier, 1963], which forever changed the epistemological landscape. He demonstrated that even when all three conditions—truth, belief, and justification—are met, a person may not have knowledge. How is this possible?

The traditional definition of knowledge, known as JTB, states that a subject S knows proposition P if and only if: (1) P is true, (2) S believes P, and (3) S is justified in believing P. This formulation, rooted in antiquity, was long considered self-evident. Indeed, if we believe something false, that is not knowledge. If we believe something true but without any grounds, it is more a lucky guess than knowledge. And if we do not believe a true and justified proposition, obviously, we do not know it. Each of these conditions seems necessary. But are they sufficient?

Gettier showed that they are not, using counterexamples now known as "Gettier cases." These cases demonstrate situations where a subject has a true and justified belief but intuitively seems not to have knowledge. For example, in one of Gettier's classic examples, Smith is convinced that Jones will get a job and that Jones has ten coins in his pocket. This belief is justified because Smith saw Jones applying and heard from the boss that Jones is the favorite. Smith also counted the coins in Jones's pocket himself. However, by coincidence, Smith himself gets the job, and, quite by chance, he also has ten coins in his own pocket. Smith's belief that the person who will get the job has ten coins in their pocket turns out to be true and justified, but does Smith know this? Intuition suggests not, since his justification concerned Jones, not himself.

Another well-known example, though not from Gettier himself but illustrating the same problem, is the case of stopped clocks. A person looks at an old wall clock that stopped exactly twelve hours ago and forms the belief that it is now, say, 3:00 PM. At that moment, it is indeed 3:00 PM. His belief is true and justified (he looks at a clock that usually shows the correct time). However, obviously, he does not know the time because his belief is true only by lucky coincidence. As Timofey Demin notes, at the core of Gettier cases lies a "causal gap between the empirical state of affairs and what the bearer of the true belief thinks" [Demin, 2019]. In the clock case, this gap is that the clock is broken, but we consider it working.

These counterexamples, despite their apparent simplicity, revealed a deep problem in the traditional understanding of knowledge. They showed that justification can be accidental or unrelated to the truth of the belief to guarantee knowledge. As John Greco expressed it, aside from Gettier problems, knowledge is a true belief that is the result of cognitive virtue [Greco, 1993]. However, it is precisely these "Gettier problems" that became the central point of discussion.

After Gettier's article was published, epistemologists faced the necessity either to abandon the JTB analysis or to modify it by adding a "fourth condition" that would exclude Gettier cases. Many philosophers tried to find this elusive fourth condition. For example, some proposed strengthening the requirement for justification to be "undefeatable" or "infallible." Others, like Alvin Goldman, developed the "causal theory of knowledge," arguing that knowledge requires a causal connection between the fact and the subject's belief about that fact [Goldman, 1967]. Demin explains that the causal theory is convincing due to the intuition about the existence of a causal gap in Gettier cases [Demin, 2019]. However, the causal theory also faced criticism, for example, in cases where the causal connection is not sufficiently clear or when it does not account for internal justification.

Internalists, for example, believe that knowledge without justification as a necessary component is defective [Demin, 2019]. They criticize the causal theory for replacing justification with causal connection, which can lead to situations where a person has a true belief but no internal access to its justification. For example, if Richard, blind from birth, knows that the wallpaper in his kitchen is green because he was told so, then his knowledge is not based on his own perception but on a causal connection coming from another person. Internalists consider this weakens the concept of knowledge.

Linda Zagzebski, in turn, argued that any attempt to add a fourth condition to the JTB analysis is doomed to fail because under certain conditions, a new Gettier case can always be constructed [Zagzebski]. She showed that if we have a true belief that is justified but whose truth is not a consequence of the justification, then one can always find a situation where the justification leads to a true belief by lucky coincidence. This leads to the idea that the Gettier problem may not be just a defect in the definition but a fundamental structural problem in the very process of judgment, as Jinho Kim suggests, speaking of a "resonance illusion" [Kim et al.].

Some philosophers, such as Ernest Sosa, proposed alternative approaches, for example, virtue epistemology, which focuses on the intellectual virtues or abilities of the knowing subject [Greco, 1993]. In this approach, knowledge is considered a true belief that results from reliable cognitive abilities or virtues of the subject. However, as Callestrup and Kawasin note, even within virtue epistemology, difficulties arise, especially regarding understanding and knowing "why."

The Gettier problem is not just an academic curiosity. It forced epistemologists to rethink the very nature of knowledge and the role of justification. It showed that knowledge is something more than just a lucky coincidence of truth and justified belief. The question of how exactly this "more" should be formulated remains one of the central challenges in contemporary epistemology. And although Gettier did not propose a new definition of knowledge, his work became a starting point for countless attempts to overcome the shortcomings he revealed, which will be the subject of our further consideration.

How to Overcome the Gettier Problem?

After Edmund Gettier demonstrated in his short but revolutionary article [Gettier, 1963] the insufficiency of the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), epistemologists faced the task of finding a way to "save" knowledge. If JTB is not always knowledge, then what is? This question became central to analytic epistemology for decades, spawning many attempts to modify or completely rethink the concept of knowledge.

One of the most intuitive strategies was to add to JTB a "fourth condition" (JTB + X) that would exclude Gettier cases. Michael Clark, for example, proposed the condition "no false beliefs," arguing that knowledge cannot be based on false premises, even if the final conclusion is true. In the case of the stopped clock, which accidentally shows the correct time, the belief about the time is true but based on a false premise about the clock's functionality. However, as quickly became clear, this condition does not solve all problems, since Gettier cases can be constructed where false premises are entirely absent.

Another approach, called reliabilism (theory of reliability), focuses on the process of belief formation. According to this theory, knowledge is a true belief formed by a reliable cognitive process [Greco, 1993]. A reliable process is one that with high probability leads to true beliefs and avoids false ones. John Greco notes that virtue epistemology is a kind of reliabilism because it "makes the idea of reliability of ability central" [Greco, 1993]. If a belief is obtained by a reliable method (e.g., vision under good conditions, memory, deduction), it can be considered knowledge. In Gettier cases, even if the belief is true and justified, it is often formed unreliably or its truth is a result of chance rather than the reliability of the process.

However, reliabilism also faces criticism. Timofey Demin points out that despite its effectiveness in combating the Gettier problem, reliabilism does not avoid other epistemological difficulties, such as the "generality problem," which questions how to determine which exact process is "reliable" in a particular case [Demin, 2019]. Moreover, some critics argue that reliabilism shifts the focus too much to external factors, ignoring internal aspects of justification, which can lead to counterintuitive conclusions.

Linda Zagzebski offers a more radical view, arguing that the Gettier problem is inevitable for any theory of knowledge that preserves the "gap between truth and justification" [Zagzebski]. She developed a "recipe" for creating Gettier cases, which, in her opinion, allows refuting any theory where truth is a necessary condition but separated from justification. If a theory requires additional conditions beyond truth for a belief to become knowledge, one can always find a situation where these conditions are met accidentally, not due to a reliable connection between them.

In response to this fundamental critique, some philosophers, such as Timothy Williamson, propose abandoning the analysis of knowledge through a set of necessary and sufficient conditions altogether. Williamson argues that knowledge is a more fundamental concept than belief, justification, or truth, and cannot be decomposed into constituent elements [Williamson, 2002]. His approach, known as "knowledge first," suggests that instead of defining knowledge through other concepts, we should define these other concepts through knowledge. This radically changes the epistemological program, moving away from attempts to "repair" JTB.

Another direction, virtue epistemology, attempts to overcome the Gettier problem by focusing on the intellectual virtues of the knowing subject. Duncan Pritchard, one of the leading proponents of this approach, argues that knowledge requires not only the absence of luck (anti-luck intuition) but also that the true belief is the result of the subject's cognitive abilities (ability intuition) [Pritchard, 2012]. That is, knowledge arises when the truth of the belief is explained by the intellectual merits or skills of the knower. If a person sees a sheep in a field, and it really is a sheep, but he mistakenly took it for a dog, then his true belief is not knowledge because it is not the result of his cognitive abilities but rather chance.

John Greco also develops virtue epistemology, defining cognitive virtue as the ability to achieve truths in a certain domain and avoid false beliefs in that domain under appropriate conditions [Greco, 1993]. He emphasizes that knowledge is a true belief that is the result of the subject's cognitive virtues. If a belief is true but its truth is due to external random factors rather than the knower's internal abilities, it will not be considered knowledge. This allows excluding Gettier cases where truth is achieved "by lucky coincidence."

However, as Callestrup and Kawasin note, even within virtue epistemology, difficulties arise, especially when it comes to "competencies" and their interaction, for example, in epistemic deferral. If knowledge depends on competencies, what about situations where we rely on experts? Is this knowledge based on our own competencies in choosing an expert or the competencies of the expert themselves? These questions show that even the most promising solutions to the Gettier problem open new areas for philosophical discussion.

Ultimately, attempts to overcome the Gettier problem have led to a significant expansion of the epistemological landscape. From simple additions to JTB to radical rethinking of the nature of knowledge, each proposal sought to close the loophole that Gettier so masterfully revealed. However, a universal and widely accepted solution has not yet been found, which raises the question: perhaps the very formulation of the question about the "fourth condition" or "saving" JTB is mistaken? Perhaps the Gettier problem does not so much indicate a defect in the definition of knowledge as fundamental limitations of our analytical approach to it, or, as Eric Olsson suggests, that we misinterpret the role of Gettier cases in evaluating theories of knowledge [Olsson, 2014].

Is the Significance of the Gettier Problem Overestimated?

After reviewing various approaches to overcoming the Gettier problem, a natural question arises: how important is this problem for epistemology at all? Has it really "blown up" the traditional understanding of knowledge, as some claim, or is its significance exaggerated, and it merely distracts from more fundamental questions? John Turri, for example, explicitly states that Edmund Gettier's 1963 article "blew a big hole in this long-standing tradition, going back to Plato through Kant and the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries," revealing that justified true belief is insufficient for knowledge [Turri, 2011]. This statement emphasizes the radical impact of Gettier on epistemology, suggesting he destroyed a centuries-old paradigm.

However, not everyone shares such a categorical assessment. Timofey Demin, for example, offers a critical view, arguing that "the significance of the Gettier problem is overestimated because the related discussion has no serious consequences for society" [Demin, 2019]. This thesis challenges the widespread opinion about the central role of the Gettier problem, shifting the discussion from a purely theoretical plane to one of practical significance. If a philosophical problem has no tangible consequences beyond academic circles, perhaps its fundamentality should indeed be reconsidered.

Demin develops his thought by pointing out that despite its prominence in analytic epistemology of the 20th century, the Gettier problem essentially serves as a way to refute theories of knowledge built on belief and truth as separate elements [Demin, 2019]. He asks: "Why understand what knowledge is?" and notes that epistemologists need a well-founded and convincing answer to this question if they want to prove the significance of their inquiries [Demin, 2019]. This is not just a rhetorical device but a call to rethink the goals of epistemological analysis. If we cannot clearly formulate why it is important to know what knowledge is, perhaps we are stuck in a self-sufficient academic game.

In this context, the question arises about what exactly we seek when trying to define knowledge. If, as Demin suggests, the analysis of knowledge cannot provide a satisfactory answer to "what is knowledge?", then perhaps it is worth abandoning the search for universal necessary and sufficient conditions [Demin, 2019]. Instead, one can focus on other aspects of cognition. For example, Timothy Williamson in his work "Knowledge and its Limits" proposes a concept in which knowledge is an explanatorily fundamental notion, not the result of a combination of truth, belief, and other factors [Williamson, 2002]. He overturns the traditional program, arguing that belief is a state, the successful form of which is knowledge.

Another approach that questions the universality and fundamentality of the Gettier problem is contextualism. Contextualists, as Demin notes, believe that the verb "to know" is sensitive to context, and the criteria for knowledge can be strict or lenient depending on the situation [Demin, 2019]. This means there is no single, universal definition of knowledge that Gettier could "undermine." Instead, we deal with a variety of related phenomena without common fundamental properties, similar to Wittgenstein's concept of games. In everyday life, we constantly use the concept of "knowing," and its meaning is determined by the specific context, not abstract philosophical conditions.

Consider the example given by Demin: Stuart is flying to Detroit. In one case, he confidently tells his seatmate that the flight is direct, based on his ticket. In another, a person transporting a kidney for transplant asks him for a higher standard of knowledge [Demin, 2019]. In both cases, Stuart uses the verb "know," but the degree of justification and confidence required of him differs radically. If knowledge depends so heavily on context, then the attempt to find a single "fourth condition" that would solve the Gettier problem once and for all may prove fruitless.

Ernest Sosa, one of the leading representatives of virtue epistemology, also offers a different view of knowledge that may reduce the sharpness of the Gettier problem. His concept of "apt deferral" suggests that knowledge can be obtained through the competence of others, not only through one's own immediate justification. In this case, the focus shifts from individual justification to the collective or social nature of knowledge. If we can know something by relying on experts, then Gettier cases where individual justification turns out to be accidental lose some of their destructive power.

Of course, this does not mean that the Gettier problem is entirely insignificant. It certainly revealed serious shortcomings in the traditional definition of knowledge and stimulated a vigorous discussion that led to the development of new epistemological theories such as reliabilism, causal theories, and virtue epistemology [Demin, 2019]. However, perhaps its main value is not in finding a universal "fourth condition" but in forcing philosophers to think more deeply about the nature of justification, the role of luck and chance in cognition, and how we use the concept of "knowledge" in various contexts.

Ultimately, the question of reassessing the significance of the Gettier problem boils down to what we expect from a theory of knowledge. If we seek a strict, universal definition applicable in all cases, the Gettier problem remains a serious obstacle. If we are willing to accept a more flexible, context-dependent, or even pluralistic view of knowledge, then its role may be reconsidered. Perhaps instead of trying to "fix" the traditional definition, we should ask what exactly we mean by "knowledge" in different situations and what functions it serves. This leads us to a broader question about the very nature of knowledge, which we will consider next.

What is the Nature of Knowledge?

Having established that the Gettier problem is not just an academic whim but a serious challenge to the traditional understanding of knowledge, a natural question arises: if knowledge is not reducible to justified true belief, then what is it? This question pushes us to a deeper reflection on the nature of knowledge itself, going beyond simply adding a "fourth condition." Perhaps we are initially looking in the wrong direction by trying to analyze knowledge through its components.

Timothy Williamson, for example, proposes a radically different approach, arguing that knowledge is a fundamental concept that cannot be analyzed through simpler components such as truth, belief, or justification [Williamson, 2002]. He overturns the traditional epistemological program that sought to decompose knowledge into elements. In his view, knowledge is not a sum of parts but something primary, irreducible, and it is through knowledge that other epistemic concepts should be understood. This is akin to how we perceive color: we cannot explain what "red" is to someone who has never seen it through more basic concepts; red simply is red.

A similar position, though with a different emphasis, is found in works where knowledge is considered a special mental state [Demin, 2019]. If knowledge is not just a combination of external conditions (truth, justification) and an internal state (belief), but itself a unique mental state, then attempts to find the missing "fourth condition" may be doomed from the start. We seek something that does not exist because knowledge is not a construct but rather a basic element of our cognitive apparatus.

However, not all agree with such a fundamentalist interpretation. Some philosophers, as Demin notes, reject the existence of a universal invariant of knowledge applicable in all cases [Demin, 2019]. Perhaps knowledge is not a single, monolithic concept but rather a family of related but non-identical concepts, each manifesting in its own context. Then the search for a single, all-encompassing definition of knowledge becomes meaningless because such a definition simply does not exist.

Within virtue epistemology, developed by thinkers such as Ernest Sosa and John Greco, the nature of knowledge is linked to the intellectual virtues of the knowing subject. Knowledge here is understood as a true belief achieved through the manifestation of intellectual virtues or cognitive abilities of the agent [Greco, 1993]. This means the focus shifts from external conditions (truth, justification) to the internal qualities of the knower. For example, Sosa distinguishes "animal knowledge," which is simply the successful result of reliable cognitive abilities, and "reflective knowledge," which includes the agent's awareness of the reliability of their abilities.

Nevertheless, Sosa's approach is not without problems. Greco points out that Sosa relies too heavily on the "subject's point of view" and their capacity for introspection regarding their cognitive abilities [Greco, 1993]. We generally do not have a clear idea of which exact cognitive faculties are responsible for forming a particular belief. If we did, cognitive science could be conducted "from the armchair," simply reflecting on our mental processes, which obviously does not correspond to reality.

Greco proposes modifying virtue epistemology to account for the importance of the "subject's point of view," but in a different sense. He introduces the notion of "normative internalism," according to which justified belief results from following correct epistemic norms that the subject recognizes [Greco, 1993]. That is, knowledge requires not only reliable abilities but also conformity of belief to internal rules and standards that the agent considers correct. For example, if a person poorly versed in mathematics believes a complex theorem not because they understand its proof but because they mistakenly derived it from axioms, their belief will not be justified, even if the theorem is true.

Interestingly, in the context of epistemic deferral and authority, Callestrup and Kawasin raise the question of how knowledge is formed through interaction with others. When we rely on experts, our knowledge may be "second-hand knowledge," but it is still knowledge. For example, to appreciate the value of English ceramics, a layperson needs the help of an expert. This does not diminish knowledge but rather shows its social nature. However, they criticize Sosa for an overly simplistic division into "practical" and "humanities" domains, where blind trust is permissible in the former but "primary intuitive understanding" is required in the latter.

Callestrup and Kawasin argue that even in the practical sphere, for example, when applying traffic rules, not only knowledge of the formulation but also "primary reflection" or "intuitive understanding" is required to apply these rules in specific situations. On the other hand, in the humanities, where critical thinking seemingly dominates, trust in authorities also plays an important role, for example, in John Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium. This emphasizes that the nature of knowledge is not static and depends on context as well as on how actively the subject is involved in the cognitive process. The nature of knowledge turns out to be much more complex and multifaceted than assumed in the classical definition. Williamson's rejection of the reductionist approach, recognition of knowledge as a mental state or as a family of concepts, and emphasis on intellectual virtues and social interaction—all point to the fact that we are looking not just for a "fourth condition" but for a fundamentally different understanding. And in this search, we inevitably face the question of the role of chance: can knowledge be the result of luck, or does it require something more reliable and controllable?

Does Luck Affect Knowledge?

If in the previous section we focused on the very nature of knowledge, trying to understand what it is, now the question inevitably arises about its vulnerability. Can knowledge be accidental? Or, more precisely, can luck play a role in the formation of knowledge without undermining its status? The Gettier problem essentially revealed this subtle boundary, showing that a true justified belief can be the result of a coincidence rather than a genuine cognitive achievement.

Most epistemologists agree that Gettier cases are decisive counterexamples to the tripartite analysis of knowledge; whatever is true about knowledge, it is not simply a belief that is both justified and true [Pritchard, 2015]. They agree that knowledge is not justified true belief because this aligns with the presence of too much luck in these cases, and knowledge excludes such luck. This "anti-luck intuition" has become a cornerstone in post-Gettier epistemology.

Consider the classic example with barns, often used to illustrate this idea. Henry is driving through the countryside where most barns are just facades. He looks at one and says, "There is a barn here." This belief is true and justified by his perceptual experience. However, as Timofey Demin notes, Henry was simply lucky to have chosen the only real barn among many fake ones [Demin, 2019]. If he had looked at any other barn, his belief would have been false. There is an element of luck here that seems to undermine the status of knowledge.

The anti-luck intuition asserts that knowledge must be stable against certain kinds of luck. Duncan Pritchard, for example, develops this idea by proposing the concept of "anti-luck epistemology" [Pritchard, 2015]. He argues that knowledge is incompatible with epistemic luck, that is, luck that makes a true belief accidental. If the truth of a belief depends on random factors unrelated to the subject's cognitive abilities, it cannot be knowledge.

However, there is a minority that challenges this dominant position. Stephen Hetherington, for example, proposes the so-called "Knowing Luckily Proposal," arguing that Gettier cases are not counterexamples at all [Madison, 2010]. He believes that knowledge can be accidental. For Hetherington, if a belief is true and justified, then it is knowledge, even if luck is involved in its formation. He essentially returns to a more liberal understanding of knowledge, where luck is not necessarily a defect.

Reliabilism, or the theory of reliability, tries to circumvent the problem of luck by focusing on the reliability of the belief-forming process. Advocates of reliabilism believe their approach successfully passes the Gettier test [Demin, 2019]. In the clock case, if the subject looked a minute later, he would be mistaken because the clock had stopped. In the barn case, if the barn were decorative, Henry would be mistaken. Gettier cases typically contain an element of luck, some unlikely coincidence. A slight deviation from the given circumstances leads to a false belief.

Linda Zagzebski in her article "The Inescapability of Gettier Problems" (1994) showed that if a theory of knowledge contains a gap between truth and justification (or local reliability, causal connection, etc.), then one can always create a Gettier case that refutes such a theory [Zagzebski]. This thesis applies to both internalism and externalism. In internalism, the gap arises due to the unavailability of some data to the bearer of the true proposition. For example, in Russell's clock case, the subject does not know the clock is broken, but the hands show the correct time. In externalism, the gap arises between what leads to truth and the truth itself.

Zagzebski illustrates this gap by analyzing the barn facade case: we have a reliable method of forming true beliefs that allows us to say the barn is real, but in fact, we were just lucky with the barn [Demin, 2019]. As long as a justified, warranted, or reliable belief does not necessarily lead to truth, a Gettier case is possible. If such necessity exists, then the theory has too strict a criterion, as was the case in classical infallibilism.

John Greco, a leading figure in virtue epistemology, offers a different view on the problem of luck. He defines cognitive virtue as a mechanism capable of forming and/or sustaining true beliefs [Greco, 1993]. For Greco, knowledge is a cognitive achievement, the result of applying the intellectual virtues of the subject. If a belief is true due to luck rather than the subject's cognitive abilities, it is not knowledge. Greco also leans toward the anti-luck intuition but through the lens of agency and virtues.

However, as Jesper Callestrup and Edoardo Kawasin note, even within virtue epistemology, difficulties arise in defining what exactly constitutes a "cognitive achievement" and how to separate it from luck. If a subject possesses all necessary virtues but the truth of their belief still depends on external, random factors, can this be considered knowledge? This question remains open and shows that the problem of luck permeates various epistemological approaches.

Ultimately, the question of the influence of luck on knowledge boils down to how much we are willing to relax the intuition that knowledge must be something more than just a lucky coincidence. If we completely reject the role of luck, we risk making knowledge practically unattainable. If we are too lenient about luck, we lose the intuitive distinction between genuine cognition and random guessing. This balance between strictness and realism remains a central problem in contemporary epistemology, pushing the search for new, more nuanced models of knowledge.

Criticism and Limitations

Despite the significant influence of the Gettier problem on epistemology, its analysis and proposed solutions are not without critical remarks and limitations. One key limitation is that most attempts to solve the Gettier problem focus on adding new conditions to the traditional definition of knowledge, which, according to Linda Zagzebski, is a hopeless path. Zagzebski convincingly showed that if a theory of knowledge contains a gap between truth and justification, one can always construct a new Gettier case that refutes such a theory [Zagzebski]. This means that infinite addition of conditions only postpones the inevitable, not solving the fundamental problem of chance that arises when the truth of a belief is not a necessary consequence of its justification. If Zagzebski were wrong, we would already have a generally accepted "fourth condition," but it still does not exist, confirming her thesis.

Another important limitation is related to the methodology used to analyze Gettier cases. Epistemologists often rely on intuitive judgments about whether a particular belief counts as knowledge in a specific scenario. However, as research in experimental philosophy shows, these intuitions may not be as universal and reliable as they seem. For example, James Beebe and Joseph Shea found that people are more likely to attribute knowledge in Gettier cases when the potential knower's actions are negative (e.g., harmful or blameworthy) than when they are neutral or positive [Beebe et al., 2013]. This raises the question of how much our philosophical intuitions underlying the Gettier problem reflect the objective reality of knowledge rather than being subject to cognitive biases or moral evaluations. If the intuitions on which the whole problem is built are unreliable, then solutions based on them may be flawed.

Finally, some philosophers question the very significance of the Gettier problem. Timofey Demin argues that "the significance of the Gettier problem is overestimated because the related discussion has no serious consequences for society" [Demin, 2019]. If epistemology is to be relevant to the real world and help us better understand how people acquire knowledge and make decisions, then a problem that boils down to searching for ever more sophisticated counterexamples may be a dead end. In this case, instead of endlessly trying to "fix" the definition of knowledge, it may be worth reconsidering the very goal of epistemological analysis. What exactly do we want to gain from defining knowledge if it cannot provide practical guidance or avoid skepticism?

Conclusions

• Edmund Gettier in 1963 convincingly showed that the traditional definition of knowledge as justified true belief (JTB) is insufficient by presenting counterexamples where all three conditions are met but knowledge is absent.
• Gettier cases demonstrate that justification can be accidental or unrelated to the truth of the belief to guarantee knowledge, revealing a fundamental gap between justification and truth.
• Attempts to solve the Gettier problem led to the search for a "fourth condition" of knowledge, as well as the development of new epistemological theories such as reliabilism, causal theories, and virtue epistemology, each aiming to exclude epistemic luck.
• Linda Zagzebski argued that the Gettier problem is inevitable for any theory of knowledge that preserves the gap between truth and justification, calling into question the very possibility of analyzing knowledge through a set of necessary and sufficient conditions.
• The significance of the Gettier problem remains a subject of debate: some consider it fundamental for rethinking epistemology, others believe its impact is overestimated and that it has no serious consequences beyond academic debates.
• Contemporary approaches to the nature of knowledge vary from asserting its irreducibility (knowledge first) to recognizing its contextual dependence and social nature, indicating a rejection of the search for a universal definition.
• Can knowledge be both the result of reliable cognitive abilities and yet contain an element of luck, or are these two aspects fundamentally incompatible?