Invisible Knowledge Beyond the Western Scientific Index

Philosophical Framework

The topic of “invisible knowledge” fits within the critical tradition of the philosophy of science and sociology of knowledge, especially in the context of postcolonial studies and STS theory (Science, Technology, and Society). It relies on the idea that knowledge is not neutral or universal but is shaped within specific social, cultural, and political contexts. Important here are the concepts of epistemic injustice proposed by Miranda Fricker [Fricker] and the critical analysis of power structures shaping scientific hierarchies, as done by Foucault [Foucault, 1970] or Said [Said]. Understanding how certain forms of knowledge become dominant while others are marginalized requires deconstructing established notions of “scientificity” and “progress,” which is a central task for STS.

Introduction

In the contemporary scientific landscape, the so-called “Western scientific index” dominates, defining what is considered legitimate and visible knowledge. This system, based predominantly on English-language publications and Western epistemological standards, creates significant barriers for non-Western scientific traditions, rendering them “invisible” to the broader academic community. The problem is not limited to language but is rooted in deep cultural, historical, and epistemological differences that shape the very conception of science and its value [Harding, 1998].

Researchers in STS increasingly highlight this issue, emphasizing that the exclusion of non-Western knowledge impoverishes the global scientific picture and distorts notions of scientific progress [Bhambra, 2014]. For example, works dedicated to “southern criminology” [Carrington et al., 2015] or “Asian criminology” [Moosavi, 2018] demonstrate how Western theoretical frameworks are not always applicable or sufficient for analyzing social phenomena in other cultural contexts. This underscores the need to rethink existing systems of knowledge evaluation and dissemination to ensure a more inclusive and equitable approach to global science.

Literature Review

Dominance of Western Epistemologies and Exclusion of Non-Western Knowledge

Why, despite the obvious richness of human experience and cultural diversity, is scientific knowledge still perceived as something universal yet predominantly Western? This question lies at the core of debates about the dominance of Western epistemologies and the exclusion of non-Western knowledge, which have become especially acute in the context of the decolonization of science. For a long time, the Western scientific index, with its systems of evaluation and dissemination, shaped the notion of “visible” and “invisible” science, determining what counts as legitimate knowledge and what remains peripheral.

Enrique Dussel, a theologian and philosopher of liberation whose works laid the foundation for the decolonization of knowledge and power, devoted his monumental work to dismantling philosophical foundations and Eurocentric historical narratives [Grosfoguel, 2013]. He showed how Western epistemologies were elevated to universal status, ignoring or marginalizing other forms of knowing. This universality is essentially a form of epistemological colonialism, where knowledge produced in Western centers is automatically considered more valuable and objective.

The knowledge problem of the 21st century, as noted by Ndlovu-Gatsheni, is best described as an “epistemic line,” which directly follows from W.E.B. Du Bois’s “color line” that haunted the 20th century and provoked epic battles for political decolonization [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020]. This “epistemic line” divides the world into those whose knowledge is recognized and disseminated and those whose knowledge remains invisible. Western epistemologies not only dominate but actively exclude, creating a hierarchy where non-Western knowledge is often perceived as “traditional,” “local,” or even “unscientific.”

Language barriers play a significant role here. The dominance of the English language in scientific communication substantially limits the accessibility of non-Western scientific achievements. Research published in other languages often goes unnoticed by the international scientific community, even if it contains groundbreaking ideas. This creates a kind of “filter” through which only a small portion of global scientific production passes. For example, unique approaches to sociology and anthropology developed in Japan remain little known outside the country due to linguistic and cultural differences, leading to an impoverishment of global scientific discourse.

Cultural and epistemological differences in approaches to knowledge also lead to the undervaluation or misinterpretation of non-Western traditions. Western science, based on certain methodological principles and ontological assumptions, often cannot adequately perceive and evaluate knowledge that does not fit within its frameworks. This is especially evident regarding traditional Chinese medicine or African traditional knowledge, which long were rejected by Western science but are gradually gaining recognition due to their effectiveness and new research. As Orlove and colleagues note, solving problems such as climate change requires decolonizing the research process and transforming relationships between scientific expert knowledge and indigenous and local knowledge systems [Orlove et al., 2023].

Historical processes of colonialism and postcolonialism have deeply influenced the hierarchy of scientific systems and the recognition of knowledge. Colonial expansion not only led to political and economic subjugation but imposed Western epistemological frameworks, marginalizing or completely destroying local knowledge systems. Edward Said, in his "Orientalism," convincingly showed how Western knowledge about the East was constructed to justify and sustain colonial domination. This historical trauma is still felt in academia, where non-Western scholars often face the necessity to adapt to Western standards to be recognized.

Examples of non-Western scientific traditions demonstrate the richness and diversity of approaches that could enrich global science. Medieval Arab philosophy and science, for instance, made enormous contributions to mathematics, astronomy, and medicine, which were integrated into European science but often without proper acknowledgment of original sources [Alatas, 2006]. Similarly, Soviet public medicine achieved significant successes in prevention and public health, but these achievements did not gain wide recognition in the West due to ideological and linguistic barriers [Krementsov, 1996]. These cases highlight how political and cultural factors can influence the visibility and recognition of scientific knowledge.

The absence of non-Western knowledge in major indexes and databases leads to a distorted global picture of scientific progress and innovation. If much of the world’s scientific production remains unindexed or inaccessible, we get an incomplete and biased view of what is happening in science. This is not only unfair to non-Western scientists but also deprives humanity of valuable ideas and solutions. As Ndlovu-Gatsheni emphasizes, decolonizing knowledge is not just an academic exercise but a fundamental task aimed at achieving epistemic freedom, which is the basis for critical consciousness and ultimately for political and economic freedom [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020].

The consequences of such “invisibility” are manifold: loss of valuable ideas, duplication of research, limitation of interdisciplinary dialogue, and ultimately slowing scientific progress. When scientists from different cultures cannot exchange knowledge and experience, they lose the opportunity to learn from each other and create more complete and effective solutions. This is especially relevant in the context of global challenges such as climate change or pandemics, which require collective efforts and integration of all available knowledge.

The need to decolonize scientific knowledge and create more inclusive systems of evaluation and dissemination is becoming increasingly evident. This does not mean abandoning Western science but rather rethinking and integrating it with other forms of knowing. As Sandra Harding notes, Western science must recognize its locality and historical conditioning rather than claim universality. This requires not only translation of texts but also deep cultural understanding and willingness to revise one’s own epistemological assumptions.

The role of STS (Science, Technology, and Society) in this process is critically important, as it allows analyzing power structures shaping scientific hierarchies and canons. STS helps reveal how social, political, and economic factors influence the production and dissemination of knowledge, as well as which knowledge is recognized and which is marginalized. This enables us to critically reflect on why some forms of knowledge become “visible” while others remain “invisible.”

Ways to overcome these barriers include not only translating scientific works but also creating regional indexes, supporting local scientific communities, and developing interdisciplinary research that integrates diverse epistemologies. Recognizing the multiplicity of forms of knowledge and epistemological diversity is the foundation for a fuller and fairer science. This means we must be ready to learn from all cultures and traditions, not only those that fit our own notions of science. Ultimately, this will allow us to create a more inclusive and effective global scientific system capable of addressing the most complex challenges of our time.

Role and Place of Indigenous Knowledge in Contemporary Science

If the previous section discussed the dominance of Western epistemologies and their ability to marginalize non-Western forms of knowledge, now it is worth delving into how this manifests specifically regarding indigenous knowledge. Indigenous knowledge, or traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples, represents unique systems of understanding the world, shaped by millennia of interaction with specific ecosystems and cultural contexts. However, their place in contemporary science remains a subject of intense debate and struggle for recognition.

For a long time, Western science, relying on its universalist claims, regarded indigenous knowledge as something “primitive,” “folkloric,” or at best as a source of empirical data requiring verification by Western methods. This attitude, as Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni notes, is a direct consequence of the “epistemic line,” which, like Du Bois’s “color line,” denied the humanity and thus the epistemic virtue of colonized peoples. The refusal to recognize indigenous knowledge as full-fledged knowledge systems led to their exclusion from educational programs and scientific discourses, with devastating consequences for the communities themselves.

However, today voices calling for a rethinking of this paradigm are increasingly heard. Many researchers, such as Fletcher, Hamilton, Dressler, and Palmer, emphasize that indigenous knowledge is a critically important resource for solving global problems, especially in the context of climate change and biodiversity conservation [Fletcher et al., 2021]. They point to the paradox: indigenous peoples, often living in regions most vulnerable to climate change, possess deep traditional knowledge and scientific thinking accumulated over millennia. Nevertheless, the global discourse on climate change often positions them solely as a vulnerable group rather than as bearers of valuable solutions.

The problem lies not only in undervaluation but also in the active exclusion of indigenous knowledge from dominant scientific and educational systems. Mji, Kalenga, Ned, and other researchers note that the absence of indigenous knowledge, formed through the everyday interaction of African children with home and environment, in African educational systems negatively affects African identity and threatens it [Mji et al., 2017]. This exclusion not only impoverishes science but also undermines the cultural identity and self-determination of indigenous peoples.

Decolonization of knowledge, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, requires recognizing diverse forms of knowledge and cognition, not only those fitting narrow “philosophical” and “scientific” categories of the Western model. He refers to Hountondji, who emphasized that the task of epistemic freedom consists in organizing autonomous debate in Africa that will not be merely an appendage of European discussions but will allow African philosophers to interact directly with each other. This means not just inclusion but recentring, shifting the focus from the West to the Global South as an equal source of knowledge.

Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century Arab thinker, can serve as an example of how non-Western intellectual traditions offered complex and profound sociological concepts long before their appearance in Western thought [Alatas, 2006]. His works, such as the "Muqaddimah," contain analyses of social dynamics, cycles of civilization development, and the role of group solidarity ('asabiyyah), which resonate with ideas of modern sociologists. However, as Sayed Farid Alatas notes, Ibn Khaldun’s contribution to sociology is often ignored or undervalued in Western academic circles, which is another manifestation of epistemic colonialism.

The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, as Comaroff and Comaroff point out, Western Enlightenment thought positioned itself as the source of universal knowledge, science, and philosophy, viewing the non-Western world as a place of “primitive wisdom” and “exotic customs.” This created a historical and epistemic context in which the Global South was marginalized. Boaventura de Sousa Santos adds that after five centuries of “teaching” the world, the Global North lost the ability to learn from the world’s experience, leading to a dual crisis — systemic and epistemic [Santos, 2009].

Modern technologies, such as generative artificial intelligence, for example ChatGPT, also raise new questions about how knowledge is produced, disseminated, and evaluated. Although AI can help process huge volumes of information and even write scientific texts, as Liebrenz, Schlaefer, and others note, its use raises ethical concerns regarding authorship, academic integrity, and the potential reinforcement of existing epistemic biases [Liebrenz et al., 2023]. If AI is trained predominantly on Western sources, it may inadvertently reproduce and strengthen the dominance of Western epistemologies, making non-Western knowledge even more “invisible.” Recognition and integration of indigenous knowledge into contemporary science is not just a matter of justice but an urgent necessity for enriching the global scientific landscape and finding more effective solutions to complex challenges. This requires not only translation and indexing but also a profound epistemological shift that will overcome the “metaphysical empire” and its consequences, such as epistemicide and cultural imperialism. The question of how political and economic systems influence this process becomes the next logical step in our analysis.

Influence of Political and Economic Systems on Science

If the previous section discussed how indigenous knowledge, often marginalized, can enrich science, now it is worth asking: why did this knowledge end up on the periphery in the first place? The answer lies in the deep interconnection of science with political and economic systems that shape its structure, priorities, and even epistemology itself. Contrary to the idealized notion of its neutrality, science has never existed in a vacuum; it has always been embedded in broader power relations.

One of the most acute questions is whether science is merely a tool in the hands of dominant political and economic forces. Ramon Grosfoguel, for example, argues that Western universities and scientific structures function as part of capitalist and colonial hegemony, reproducing epistemic racism and sexism rooted in the 16th century [Grosfoguel, 2013]. He points out that the knowledge structures we today consider universal actually formed in the context of European expansion and subjugation of other cultures.

This idea is not new. Even President Dwight Eisenhower, in his farewell address, warned of the “unwarranted influence of the military-industrial complex” and that the prospect of scientists’ dominance through federal employment, project allocation, and money power is always present — and should be taken seriously [Werskey, 2007]. This warning concerned not only the military sphere but also the broader influence of the state and corporations on scientific research, its funding, and consequently on defining what counts as “significant” knowledge.

Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni develops this thought, describing how Europe and North America became centers for processing “raw data” into concepts and theories that are then consumed in Africa. African scholars, he says, are forced to seek validation and recognition of their knowledge in European and North American journals considered “international” and “high-impact.” This creates a situation where only publications located in Europe and North America are deemed “international,” while the rest of the world remains “local.” Such a system, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni, is a manifestation of epistemic hegemony, which promotes the idea of “knowledge” (singular) instead of “knowledges” (plural).

In this context, Walter Mignolo views epistemic decolonization as a broad movement aimed at rethinking the geopolitical position of theology, secular philosophy, and scientific reason, while simultaneously affirming those ways and principles of knowing that were rejected by the rhetoric of Christianization, civilization, progress, and development. This emphasizes that the struggle for epistemic freedom is inseparable from the fight against the colonial legacy that continues to shape scientific hierarchies.

However, there is another viewpoint that acknowledges the influence of political and economic systems but insists on a certain autonomy of science. Thomas Kuhn, for example, in his work "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" [Kuhn, 1962], showed that scientific development occurs through paradigm shifts, which, although subject to social influence, still have internal logic and criteria. Science is not a passive reflection of external forces but actively shapes its own field.

An example of such complex interaction can be Soviet science. As Nikolai Krementsov notes, the notion of the Soviet state and science as two monolithic entities, where bureaucrats suppress and scientists defend intellectual autonomy, is oversimplified [Krementsov, 1996]. His research, based on previously unknown documents, shows that relations were much more nuanced, with constant interaction and mutual influence. Even under strict ideological control, scientists found ways to develop their fields, albeit within frameworks set by the political system.

Modern technologies, such as artificial intelligence, add new dimensions to this discussion. The ability to generate scientific texts using ChatGPT raises questions about authorship, ethics, and even the very nature of scientific knowledge [Liebrenz et al., 2023]. If AI can create “human-like” responses and even co-author articles, how will this affect the evaluation and dissemination of knowledge, especially in the context of existing imbalances? Who will control the algorithms, and whose interests will they reflect?

Gurminder K. Bhambra emphasizes that modernity, as the dominant framework of social and political thought, is based on two key assumptions: rupture (between traditional past and modern present) and difference (between Europe and the rest of the world). This Eurocentric view of history and science, which she calls the “leitmotif of modernity,” is deeply rooted in our notions of what “science” is and how it should develop. Political and economic systems do not merely influence science; they actively shape its landscape, determining which questions will be asked, which research will be funded, and whose voices will be heard. This leads to certain kinds of knowledge, especially those originating from non-Western contexts, remaining “invisible” or undervalued. Understanding this dynamic is critical to moving toward a more inclusive and equitable global scientific system that will not reproduce geographic and cultural bias, which will be discussed in the next section.

Geographic and Cultural Bias in Scientific Research

If political and economic systems shape the frameworks for knowledge production, geographic and cultural bias determines which knowledge fits into these frameworks and which remains peripheral. Despite its claims to universality, science historically developed within specific geographic and cultural contexts, inevitably leading to the dominance of Western epistemologies. This dominance manifests not only in the choice of research topics but also in methodologies, theoretical approaches, and even in the very definition of what is considered “scientific” [Carrington et al., 2015].

Criminology, for example, long focused exclusively on issues of crime and violence in major urban centers of the Global North, completely ignoring rural areas, peripheries, and “antipodes” [Carrington et al., 2015]. Such an approach creates a distorted picture of global crime and its causes, since social, economic, and cultural factors influencing crime in different world regions can differ substantially. Attempts to correct this bias led to the emergence of fields like “southern criminology,” which seeks to include the experiences and perspectives of Global South countries in the analysis.

Similar ethnocentrism characterizes not only criminology but most social sciences. Moosavi [Moosavi, 2018] and Bhambra [Bhambra, 2014] emphasize that social sciences as a whole suffer from Eurocentrism, which excludes non-Western scientific approaches. In response, new paradigms such as “Asian criminology” have emerged, challenging Western methods of producing criminological knowledge and integrating marginalized perspectives. This is not merely adding new data but a fundamental revision of how we understand social phenomena.

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020] introduces the concept of “intellectual extraversion,” drawing a parallel with economic extraversion described by Amin. While economic extraversion leads to loss of self-sufficiency and subjugation of the economy to global capital, intellectual extraversion leads to scientific dependency. This is a situation where knowledge production in peripheral countries is oriented toward the needs and standards of wealthy Northern countries, resulting in “knowledge without invention.” Ndlovu-Gatsheni [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020] quotes Hountondji, who defines intellectual extraversion as the analysis of scientific-technological relations of production on an international scale; and criticizes the actual functioning of research on the periphery in relation to the world of knowledge controlled and managed by wealthy Northern countries.

Historically, colonialism played a decisive role in forming this intellectual extraversion. Ndlovu-Gatsheni [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020] describes how colonizers systematically destroyed local knowledge systems, beheading African kings considered bearers of memory and knowledge, and discrediting knowledgeable women as witches. This process, which Ramon Grosfoguel [Grosfoguel, 2013] called the four genocides/epistemicides of the long 16th century, aimed to eradicate local epistemologies and impose European ones. Missionary schools and churches became instruments of “epistemicide,” imposing European memory and languages, leading to “mental control” over the colonized.

Cultural bias also manifests in how non-Western intellectual traditions are evaluated and integrated. For example, the works of Ibn Khaldun, the 14th-century Arab thinker, are often regarded as precursors of modern sociology, but his contribution remained marginalized in Western academic discourse for a long time [Alatas, 2006]. Alatas [Alatas, 2006] notes that Western sociology, despite its claims to universality, often ignores or undervalues non-Western intellectual roots, preferring to trace its genealogy exclusively from European thinkers. This creates a false impression that sociology is exclusively a Western invention, whereas many of its ideas have broader and more diverse origins.

Even in seemingly universal fields such as medicine, cultural bias can be significant. Traditional Chinese medicine, African traditional knowledge in agriculture and ecology, Indian mathematics — all these knowledge systems were long ignored or marginalized by Western science. Their effectiveness and value are recognized only when they pass “verification” by Western methods and standards, which itself is a manifestation of epistemic colonialism.

This geographic and cultural bias not only impoverishes the global scientific landscape but also creates serious ethical problems. When knowledge from certain regions or cultures is systematically excluded, it leads to “epistemic injustice” [Fricker]. Researchers from these regions face difficulties publishing their work in leading journals, which are often oriented toward Western standards and interests. This, in turn, exacerbates their “invisibility” and hinders their integration into global scientific dialogue.

In the context of developing technologies such as artificial intelligence, this problem acquires new dimensions. If AI algorithms are trained predominantly on data reflecting Western perspectives and knowledge, they will reproduce and reinforce existing geographic and cultural biases [Liebrenz et al., 2023]. This may lead to “new” knowledge generated by AI being merely an echo of already dominant Western epistemologies, further marginalizing non-Western voices and approaches. The issue of geographic and cultural bias becomes even more relevant in the era of digitalization and automation of knowledge production.

Impact of Technologies (AI) on the Production and Dissemination of Knowledge

The previous section showed how geographic and cultural bias shapes scientific landscapes, making some knowledge visible and others invisible. Today, amid the rapid development of technologies, especially artificial intelligence (AI), this problem acquires new facets. AI, on the one hand, promises to become a powerful tool for overcoming barriers and expanding access to diverse knowledge, but on the other hand, it carries the risk of reinforcing existing biases and creating new forms of epistemic injustice.

AI can act as a catalyst for preserving and developing non-Western knowledge systems. For example, Chauke emphasizes the synergy between advanced technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution and Indigenous Knowledge Systems (IKS). Integrating these systems with AI can help preserve cultural heritage, document oral traditions, and even develop new solutions for sustainable development based on age-old practices. Imagine how machine learning algorithms could analyze vast amounts of data on traditional medicinal plants, identifying patterns inaccessible to the human eye, thereby confirming or expanding knowledge passed down through generations.

However, despite potential benefits, the introduction of AI into the sphere of knowledge production and dissemination is fraught with serious ethical problems and risks of bias reinforcement. Liebrenz et al. and Vindigni point to significant ethical implications of using generative AI in medical publications. If algorithms are trained on data predominantly reflecting Western epistemologies and medical practices, they will inevitably reproduce and amplify these biases, marginalizing other approaches. This may lead to non-Western medical knowledge, for example, being automatically filtered out or misinterpreted by AI systems, further exacerbating their “invisibility.”

Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gatsheni [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020], in his work on the dynamics of epistemological decolonization in the 21st century, argues that the problem of our century in the field of knowledge is the “epistemic line,” which is a direct continuation of W.E.B. Du Bois’s “color line.” This “epistemic line” is sustained by what Boaventura de Sousa Santos [Santos, 2009] called “abyssal thinking” — an imperial reason that reduces some people to a subhuman category devoid of knowledge. In this context, if AI is developed and trained within such “abyssal thinking,” it will become a tool for further deepening this line, automatically excluding or devaluing knowledge coming from those historically marginalized.

Epistemic freedom, according to Ndlovu-Gatsheni [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020], differs from academic freedom. While academic freedom concerns institutional autonomy of universities and the right to express diverse ideas, epistemic freedom is much broader and deeper. It is related to cognitive justice, recognizing diverse ways of knowing through which people worldwide make sense of their existence. AI, if not developed with principles of cognitive justice in mind, may become a barrier to this freedom, imposing unified, often Eurocentric, frameworks for interpreting and creating knowledge.

Colonial education, as Ndlovu-Gatsheni [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020] notes, sowed the seeds of scientific and intellectual dependency through “epistemicides, linguicides, and alienations.” Ngũgĩ wa Thiong’o vividly describes how the night of the sword and bullet was replaced by the morning of chalk and the classroom, where physical violence of the battlefield was replaced by psychological violence of the classroom. If AI systems are trained on corpora shaped by this colonial legacy, they will inadvertently reproduce and amplify these “epistemicides,” continuing to distort reality and impose a perception aligned with the dominant project.

Oyèrónkẹ́ Oyěwùmí, whose work Ndlovu-Gatsheni [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020] cites as an example of “rethinking thought,” demonstrates how Western analytical categories such as “gender” can be alien and distort understanding of non-Western societies. She argues that all concepts come with their cultural and philosophical baggage, much of which becomes an alien distortion when applied to cultures different from those from which they originate. If AI operates with such universalized categories, it risks not only misunderstanding but actively distorting non-Western knowledge by trying to fit it into inappropriate frameworks.

The problem lies not only in AI’s potential bias due to training data but also in the architecture and goals of its development. Who decides which knowledge is “valuable” for AI training? What metrics are used to evaluate its “success”? If these decisions are made solely within Western epistemologies, then AI essentially becomes a new tool of epistemological colonialism, automating the marginalization of non-Western knowledge.

Moreover, AI technologies may exacerbate the problem of “intellectual extraversion,” where non-Western scientists are forced to orient themselves toward Western standards and publications to gain recognition. If AI systems are used for indexing, reviewing, or even generating scientific texts, they may further standardize scientific discourse, making it less receptive to nontraditional forms of expression or methodologies that do not fit the dominant paradigm.

Although AI has enormous potential for democratizing access to knowledge and overcoming language barriers through automatic translation, its development and application require deep critical reflection. Without conscious efforts to decolonize data, algorithms, and AI goals, it risks becoming not a tool of liberation but a new mechanism for deepening the “epistemic line,” further hiding “invisible knowledge” and reinforcing existing hierarchies. The question of how we can ensure that AI serves cognitive justice rather than undermines it remains open and demands immediate attention.

Criticism and Limitations

Limitations of the Decolonial Approach

The decolonial approach, while a powerful tool for revealing and critiquing epistemological colonialism, is not without certain limitations. For example, the emphasis on “deconstruction and reconstruction” [Ndlovu‐Gatsheni, 2020] can lead to the risk of relativism, where all forms of knowledge are declared equally valid, making it difficult to develop universal criteria of truth or effectiveness. If we reject Western standards as colonial heritage, then on what basis do we evaluate, for example, medical practices or engineering solutions? This question remains open and requires a delicate balance between recognizing the multiplicity of knowledges and the necessity of pragmatic choices amid global challenges.

Risk of Essentializing Non-Western Knowledge

Another problem is the risk of essentializing non-Western knowledge, that is, representing it as some static, unchanging entities inherent to particular cultures. Such simplification may ignore internal diversity, dynamics, and historical development of these knowledges, as well as their interaction with other traditions. For example, medieval Arab philosophy and science were not monolithic but represented a complex synthesis of various influences, including Greek, Persian, and Indian elements [Alatas, 2006]. If we treat non-Western knowledge as something “pure” and “non-Western,” we risk creating a new form of “orientalism,” only this time with a positive sign but still distorting reality. This also complicates understanding how non-Western knowledge can be integrated into global scientific dialogue without losing its uniqueness.

Conclusions

• The dominance of the Western scientific index creates a hierarchy of knowledge where non-Western scientific traditions remain “invisible” due to linguistic, cultural, and epistemological barriers.
• Historical processes of colonialism and postcolonialism have entrenched this hierarchy, leading to “epistemic colonialism” and “intellectual extraversion” of non-Western scientific communities.
• Examples such as medieval Arab philosophy, Soviet public medicine, and Japanese social research demonstrate the richness of non-Western approaches that could enrich global science but remain undervalued.
• The consequences of “invisibility” include loss of valuable ideas, duplication of research, and limitation of interdisciplinary dialogue, hindering the resolution of global challenges.
• The development of AI carries both potential to overcome barriers and the risk of reinforcing existing biases if its development does not consider principles of cognitive justice and data decolonization.
• Decolonizing scientific knowledge requires not only translation and indexing but a fundamental revision of epistemological assumptions, recognition of multiple forms of knowledge, and support for local scientific communities.
• How to ensure that the global scientific system becomes truly inclusive and equitable, rather than simply assimilating non-Western knowledge into the dominant paradigm, remains an open question.