Comparative Analysis of the Positions of Slavoj Žižek and François Malabou

Introduction

Philosophical thought of the 20th and 21st centuries often turns to reinterpreting classical traditions, especially Hegelian dialectics and psychoanalysis. In this context, the works of Slavoj Žižek and François Malabou represent two powerful, though different, directions that seek not merely to interpret but to radically transform our understanding of subjectivity, reality, and the possibility of change. Both thinkers, each in their own way, challenge established notions, offering new conceptual tools for analyzing the contemporary world.

Žižek, drawing on Hegel and Lacan, constructs his philosophy around notions of emptiness, lack, and the Real, emphasizing their constitutive role in the formation of the subject and ideology [Johnston, 2018]. His approach is often characterized as "transcendental materialism," which aims to rethink Hegelian dialectics for the 21st century, exploring human relations with nature, freedom, and possibilities for radical sociopolitical change [Johnston, 2018]. Malabou, also inspired by Hegel, develops the concept of plasticity, which allows for understanding the capacity for formation, deformation, and transformation, linking it with neurobiology and epigenesis [Malabou, 2015]. Her works, as noted by Mateus Henrique da Mota Ferreira, lie at the intersection of neorationalism and neomaterialism, exploring the "epigenesis of reason (or thought)" [Ferreira, 2026]. We see that despite different starting points, both philosophers are deeply rooted in traditions they simultaneously critique and develop, offering unique perspectives on fundamental questions of being and consciousness.

Detailed Exposition

What is the place of epigenetics in contemporary philosophy and how does it influence transcendental concepts?

Epigenetics, seemingly a purely biological discipline, unexpectedly intrudes into philosophy, challenging established notions of the subject, identity, and even the very possibility of transcendental knowledge. How can a science studying heritable changes in gene expression without altering the DNA sequence itself influence philosophical concepts that traditionally operate with categories of reason, consciousness, and a priori structures? This question is not merely rhetorical; it points to a profound shift in understanding the relationship between the material and the ideal, between the biological substrate and philosophical reflection.

Mateus Henrique da Mota Ferreira argues that epigenetics opens new paths for transcendental philosophy by rethinking the relations between biology and philosophy [Ferreira, 2026]. He sees it not simply as additional empirical material but as a catalyst for revising the very structure of the transcendental. Whereas previously the transcendental was understood as something preceding experience and forming its conditions, now, under the influence of epigenetics, it can be conceived as something dynamic, formed, and even inheritable. This does not mean reducing philosophy to biology but rather indicates the need to create a new, more complex model that takes into account the interpenetration of these spheres.

Catherine Malabou, one of the key thinkers working at the intersection of philosophy and neuroscience, considers epigenetics a fundamental element for developing the so-called epigenetic philosophy [Malabou, 2015]. For her, it is not merely a metaphor but a literal indication of plasticity and transformation as central characteristics of being and subjectivity. Malabou explores how biological plasticity, especially neuroplasticity, can serve as a model for understanding philosophical concepts of change, formation, and deformation. She asks: if the brain is capable of constant reorganization, what does this mean for our identity, our memory, our capacity for self-determination?

In her work "Before Tomorrow: Epigenesis and Rationality," Malabou delves into the concept of epigenesis, which she believes offers a new perspective on rationality [Malabou, 2015]. Epigenesis, as a developmental process in which new structures and functions arise from the interaction of genetic and environmental factors, becomes for her a key to understanding how reason is formed and transformed. This allows her to move away from traditional views of reason as a fixed, a priori entity and to present it as something dynamic, constantly in the process of becoming. Epigenetics not only complements philosophy but challenges its fundamental assumptions about the nature of reason and its relation to the world.

Ferreira notes that Malabou's work is part of a broader "triple virada" (tripla-virada) in contemporary philosophy, including materialist, ontological, and speculative turns [Ferreira, 2026]. These tendencies, in his view, are united by a common aspiration to destabilize and rethink the transcendental. Epigenetics, in this context, acts as one of the vectors that allow a new look at the place of subjectivity, the relationship between philosophy and sciences, as well as the complex interrelation between the political, social, and material. The question of how the subject is formed becomes not only philosophical but biological, requiring consideration of epigenetic mechanisms.

Malabou's interview with Frank Ruda and Agon Hamza emphasizes her aspiration to create an "epigenetic philosophy" that explores not only formation but also deformation and even destruction [Malabou, 2015]. She is interested not only in how we build ourselves but also in how we break down, how trauma or illness can change our identity at the deepest level. This leads to the notion of "destructive plasticity," which, as Ainoa Suarez Gomez notes, allows rethinking the consequences of trauma and illnesses such as stroke for the subject's identity [Gómez, 2026]. Epigenetics not only expands our understanding of formation but also forces us to confront the fragility and variability of our being.

Adrian Johnston, in turn, in the context of transcendental materialism that he develops analyzing Žižek's ontology, also touches on issues close to epigenetic philosophy [Johnston, 2008]. He argues that transcendental materialism, unlike some versions of dialectical materialism, allows for the "full independence" of the subject from its ontologically material foundations, while recognizing them as necessary conditions [Johnston, 2018]. This resonates with Malabou's idea that the biological substrate, while foundational, does not fully determine philosophical or psychological identity, leaving room for plasticity and transformation.

However, as Christopher Watkin notes, Malabou's concept of plasticity contains an "irreconcilable ambiguity" [Watkin, 2016]. On the one hand, it avoids reducing the human to fixed traits by presenting plasticity as the possibility of transforming all traits. On the other hand, it risks exaggerating this capacity, turning plasticity into a kind of "meta-ability." This raises the question of the limits of plasticity: is there something that remains unchanged, or is everything subject to constant transformation? Epigenetics, in this sense, offers not only new possibilities but also new challenges for understanding stability and variability.

In the context of epigenetic philosophy, the question of "meta-transcendentalism" becomes especially relevant. Johnston defines meta-transcendentalism as the idea that "pre-thinking/non-thinking material nature is meta-transcendental in the sense that it constitutes the conditions of possibility for the very existence of such a transcendental subject as emerging" [Johnston, 2018]. This means that the conditions of possibility for knowledge (the transcendental) themselves have conditions of possibility in material nature (the meta-transcendental). Epigenetics, demonstrating how the environment influences gene expression and thus organism development, including the brain, offers a concrete mechanism for understanding this meta-transcendental dimension. Epigenetics not only adds a new layer to our understanding of biology but forces us to rethink the very nature of the transcendental. It proposes a model in which the conditions of possibility for knowledge and subjectivity are not fixed and a priori but dynamic, formed in the process of interaction between genetics and environment. This opens the way to a philosophy that is not afraid of dialogue with science but actively uses its discoveries to deepen its own understanding of being. However, it also poses the question of how to maintain critical distance without reducing philosophical problems to biological explanations and how to integrate this new knowledge into a broader critical framework. How do neorationalism and neomaterialism relate in the context of this critical philosophy, and how can they help us comprehend these new challenges?

How do neorationalism and neomaterialism relate in the context of critical philosophy?

If epigenetics in the previous section questioned rigid boundaries of the transcendental, neorationalism and neomaterialism continue this work but at the level of the very structure of thought and reality. They do not merely explore how the subject is formed but rather how reality itself, including material conditions, actively participates in this formation, challenging traditional notions of consciousness as something primary or fully autonomous. This is not just a shift in focus but a radical rethinking of what we can consider "real" and "knowable".

Neorationalism, unlike classical rationalism, does not strive for a priori truths detached from experience. Instead, it investigates how rationality itself is formed and transformed in interaction with the world. This is not a rejection of reason but its critical rethinking, acknowledging its historicity and conditionality. In this sense, neorationalism often intersects with neomaterialism, which insists on the active role of matter in forming not only the physical world but also our concepts and subjectivities. Matter here is not a passive substrate but a dynamic force capable of self-organization and transformation.

One of the key authors working at the intersection of these directions is Adrian Johnston. He develops the concept of "transcendental materialism," which seeks to overcome correlationalism—the idea that we can only know the correlation between subject and object but not reality itself outside this correlation. Johnston asserts that "transcendental materialism consists not only of the ontology of a meta-transcendental substance but also of the metaphysics of transcendental subjectivity" [Ferreira, 2026]. This means that the theory of being establishes necessary but not sufficient conditions for the theory of the subject. The subject is not something given from the outset, as in subjective idealisms, but arises from material conditions.

Johnston, in his works, including those co-written with Malabou, aims to show that "if the thinking subject is transcendental in the sense of instantiating conditions of possibility for knowledge, then the material pre-/non-thinking nature is meta-transcendental in the sense of constituting, in turn, the conditions of possibility for the very existence of such a transcendental subject as emerging" [Ferreira, 2026]. This radically changes our understanding of the transcendental: it is not something preceding experience but rather arises from it, from material processes. This is the "meta-transcendentalism of anthropogenesis, the becoming-subject-transcendental of the human animal" [Ferreira, 2026].

In this context, François Malabou, with her concept of plasticity, becomes an important connecting link. She explores how the brain, as a material organ, possesses the capacity for formation, deformation, and transformation, which has profound philosophical implications for understanding identity and trauma. Her work "What Should We Do with Our Brain?" directly engages with neuroscience to show how the material plasticity of the brain affects our subjectivity. Malabou, as Ferreira notes, "does with neuroscience what other researchers/thinkers do with various fields of the humanities or natural sciences, or other forms of nonmodern Western knowledge" [Ferreira, 2026].

However, while Malabou focuses on neurobiological aspects, other neomaterialists expand this perspective. For example, Mackenzie Wark, also mentioned by Ferreira, proposes an "empirical exit" from correlationalism by considering "the question of detection and measurement, which I here call tertiary qualities of nonhuman perception belonging to the apparatus" [Ferreira, 2026]. This means that not only our brain but also technologies and apparatuses through which we know the world actively shape our understanding of reality. These are not mere tools but active participants in the process of cognition, making "nonhuman primary qualities readable through human secondary qualities" [Ferreira, 2026]. Neorationalism and neomaterialism do not merely complement each other but merge in critical philosophy, offering new ways of understanding reality. They show that rationality is not static but constantly formed and reformed in dialogue with the material world. This is not just "transcendental real" but "transcendental can be investigated" [Ferreira, 2026]. This investigation goes beyond traditional philosophy, involving data from natural and human sciences.

While Malabou explores plasticity as the capacity for change and adaptation, Žižek, though not a direct neomaterialist in the same sense, also critically rethinks Hegelian dialectics and psychoanalysis, emphasizing emptiness, rupture, and lack as constitutive elements of subjectivity and reality. His approach, as Johnston notes, represents a "new German idealism" aiming to create a "new materialism for the twenty-first century" [Johnston, 2018]. Like Malabou, Žižek seeks ways to overcome traditional dualisms but does so through the lens of Lacanian Real and Hegelian dialectics.

The difference between these approaches, however, manifests in their relation to trauma. For Žižek, the subject arises from a traumatic encounter with the Real, leading to a radical rupture that paradoxically constitutes subjectivity. Trauma here is something impossible to fully integrate but is the source of subjectivation. Malabou, by contrast, explores trauma as a threat to identity but simultaneously as an opportunity for reformatting. Her concept of "destructive plasticity" shows how trauma can destroy existing structures but also create new ones. This is not a passive acceptance of destruction but an active process in which the subject can reassemble itself.

Ultimately, neorationalism and neomaterialism in the context of critical philosophy offer us not just new answers but new questions. They compel us to rethink the very nature of knowledge, subjectivity, and reality, going beyond traditional philosophical categories. They show that philosophy cannot remain isolated from other fields of knowledge, be it neuroscience, physics, or sociology. This is a constant dialogue in which the transcendental is not fixed but constantly redefined and recreated in interaction with the material world. This dialogue, in turn, leads us to understand how these new approaches influence broader philosophical movements such as the "triple turn," which we will consider next.

What is the role of the 'triple turn' (Tripla-Virada) in contemporary philosophical thought?

In the previous section, we discussed how neorationalism and neomaterialism rethink critical philosophy, striving to overcome dualisms and integrate scientific understanding with philosophical reflection. This search for synthesis, the aspiration for a "synoptic picture" of reality, finds its continuation and deepening in the concept of the "triple turn" (Tripla-Virada), which offers new paths for transcendental research, including through the prism of epigenetics [Ferreira, 2026]. If neorationalism and neomaterialism lay the foundation for rethinking the subject in the context of its natural and social conditioning, then the "triple turn" expands these horizons, offering a more complex view of the interaction between the ideal and the material, between the knowing subject and the knowable reality.

The "triple turn" is not simply a set of separate directions but rather a methodological approach that seeks to rethink the very notion of the transcendental, taking it beyond the traditional Kantian understanding. As Ferreira notes, this project can be described as "explaining the entanglement between conceptual ideality and physical reality," while avoiding dualisms incapable of explaining the connection between distinguishable terms [Ferreira, 2026]. Philosophy, in this context, does not merely differentiate and separate but does so "always with the aim of final integration." This aspiration for integration is especially relevant in light of modern scientific discoveries that question rigid boundaries between mind and body, culture and nature.

One key aspect of the "triple turn" is the so-called "meta-transcendentalization," which involves shifting the transcendental, historicizing it as a sociolinguistic practice and naturalizing it as a subset of neurocognitive processes selected through evolution [Ferreira, 2026]. In other words, the transcendental is not considered an a priori given but something formed and changed in the process of historical development and biological evolution. This allows overcoming the limitations of traditional critical philosophy, which often remained confined within the framework of subjective experience and linguistic structures.

Within this "triple turn," three main lines are distinguished, which, although having their own features, are united by a common aspiration to rethink the transcendental. The first line, which can be called naturalistic or materialist (meta-)transcendental, seeks to reunite philosophy and sciences, overcoming the limitations of the critical project. Here philosophy not only critiques or deconstructs but actively interacts with natural sciences, cognitive sciences, and anthroposocial studies to rethink the transcendental, naturalizing it and simultaneously historicizing the natural [Ferreira, 2026]. This means there is no transcendental outside the natural-historical development of forms of knowledge and modes of interaction among individuals.

The second line of the "triple turn" is associated with speculative realism, although the term "speculative" is contested among its proponents. Ray Brassier, for example, criticizes the broad use of this term, arguing that it often reduces to "an ordinary adjective meaning 'suppositional, fantastic, unsupported by evidence or facts'" [Brassier, 2018a]. However, in a stricter sense, the speculative approach, as Brassier understands it, seeks "to identify the general characteristics that any conceptual system must possess to know the nature of which it is a part." This "transcendental naturalism" assumes that reason is part of nature and, therefore, our knowledge of our own reason cannot fundamentally differ from knowledge of other parts of nature. The investigation of the transcendental becomes an investigation of its natural conditions.

The third line, closely associated with François Malabou and her concept of plasticity, offers an epigenetic approach to the transcendental. Malabou, as noted, explores the brain's capacity for formation, deformation, and transformation, which has profound philosophical implications for understanding identity and trauma. In the context of the "triple turn," epigenetics becomes not merely a biological discipline but a metaphor for understanding how external factors and experience can change not only phenotypic expressions but, more broadly, transcendental structures of knowledge and being. This allows overcoming rigid determinism and opens space for understanding the subject as constantly forming and reforming.

The "triple turn" does not simply unite various philosophical directions but proposes a new way of thinking about the transcendental that goes beyond traditional oppositions. It aspires to a "synoptic" philosophy capable of reconciling the "basic divergence in our understanding of reality"—between self-understanding as rational subjects and scientific understanding of ourselves as physical objects. This is not merely an attempt at synthesis but rather a rethinking of the very nature of knowledge and being, where the transcendental becomes a dynamic, historically and biologically conditioned process.

In this context, the "triple turn" offers a powerful toolkit for analyzing contemporary crises of subjectivity and political stagnation discussed by Žižek and Malabou. If Žižek emphasizes emptiness and rupture as constitutive elements of subjectivity, and Malabou focuses on plasticity as the capacity for transformation, then the "triple turn" provides a broader context for understanding these concepts. It allows seeing how these ruptures and transformations fit into a wider picture of natural-historical development and how they can be comprehended through the prism of interaction between the ideal and the material.

However, despite the aspiration for integration, the "triple turn" is not a unified doctrine. Its various directions offer their own emphases and methodologies. For example, while some seek to reconnect philosophy with the absolute through a narrow understanding of rationality and scientificity, others, as Ferreira notes, attempt to "explode the speculative process by generalizing it to nonhuman agents" [Ferreira, 2026]. This diversity of approaches indicates that the "triple turn" is more an open field for research than a finished system. It poses the question of how we can think about the transcendental in a world where boundaries between nature and culture, mind and body become increasingly blurred, and how this new understanding can affect our conception of the "Pluriverse" and its influence on postcolonial and decolonial studies.

How does the concept of the 'Pluriverse' influence postcolonial and decolonial studies?

If the "triple turn" (Tripla-Virada) in philosophy, as discussed earlier, shifts emphasis from epistemology to ontology, from subject to object, and from representation to speculation, then the concept of the "Pluriverse" becomes one of the most radical expressions of this ontological shift, especially in the context of postcolonial and decolonial studies. It not only offers a new perspective but also questions the very foundation of Western thought, its claims to universality and singular truth.

At the core of the idea of the "Pluriverse" lies a profound critique of Eurocentrism and coloniality of knowledge, which, according to proponents of this concept, have shaped the dominant paradigm of worldview. E. Dussel convincingly shows how European modernity, starting with the conquest of America, constructed itself as the sole source of rationality and progress, reducing all other forms of knowledge and being to the status of "primitive" or "alternative." This "coloniality of knowledge" is not limited to the past but continues to reproduce itself in modern academic structures, scientific methodologies, and even everyday notions of "nature" and "culture."

The concept of the "Pluriverse" directly challenges this "universality" or "uni-mundism," as some researchers call it. It asserts that there is not one objective reality that different cultures merely interpret differently, but many coexisting worlds, each possessing its own ontological reality. As Escobar, Cadena, and Blaser note, "the idea of a 'world made of one world' (Western, modern, capitalist, secular, rational, liberal, patriarchal, anthropocentric, or whatever we want to call it) is perhaps the deepest and most decisive legacy of the modern/colonial world system, which unfolds from the conquest of America to the present day." This "One-World" (Mundo-Uno) is the result of specific historical practices, its fundamental feature being a double ontological division: between humans and nonhumans, culture and nature, as well as between those functioning within this "One-World" and those insisting on constructing multiple worlds from the continuous whole of life. The "Pluriverse" is not merely a metaphor for cultural diversity. It is an ontological assertion of the multiplicity of realities that, although interconnected, cannot be reduced to one another. "The Pluriverse can be considered as consisting of multiple worlds that interweave and, although co-constructed, cannot be reduced to one another" [Ferreira, 2026]. This idea is directly connected to the Zapatista call to "build a world in which many worlds fit." It implies not just tolerance for other viewpoints but recognition of their ontological legitimacy.

For postcolonial and decolonial studies, this has enormous significance. If dominant Western science claims universal knowledge of the "one world," then the pluriversal approach proposes to decolonize anthropology and other disciplines that historically served as tools of colonial domination [Ferreira, 2026]. It questions the assumption of a common "nature" or "world" that Western science "discovered," while other peoples merely "interpret" or have "alternative" views. Instead, pluriversality asserts that there are other "natural sciences" and "human sciences," defined by criteria "alien" to the Euro-native project of global colonization [Ferreira, 2026].

The concept of "ontological self-determination" of peoples, developed based on the works of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, becomes central in this context. It means "returning the ontological to the 'peoples,' rather than the peoples to the 'ontological.'" The politics of ontology as the self-determination of the other is the ontology of politics as the decolonization of all thought in the face of other thought—thinking about thought itself as "always already" in relation to the thought of others. This radically changes the conception of science: it is not rejected but critically rethought through "external" determinants.

Pluriversal studies are by nature "inter-epistemic," meaning they start from the premise that there are multiple configurations of knowledge and wisdom beyond what is sanctioned by academia. This implies that pluriversal research must forge its own paths beyond academic frameworks, possibly together with those people and nonhumans—with the Earth—who, based on deep interconnectedness, insist against all odds on imagining and intertwining other worlds.

The "Pluriverse" not only critiques Eurocentrism but offers a concrete path toward decolonizing thought, science, and politics. It calls for creating a world where "the worlds of all peoples must coexist with dignity and peace, without being diminished, exploited, or impoverished." This vision overcomes patriarchal attitudes, racism, casteism, and other forms of discrimination, urging people to rethink their role as a humble part of "nature," leaving behind narrow anthropocentric notions of progress based on economic growth.

This concept undoubtedly opens new horizons for understanding how various forms of knowledge and being can coexist and interact. However, it also poses complex questions about how to avoid relativism, how to establish dialogue between ontologically different worlds, and how to build a common political platform amid such radical multiplicity. After all, if each world is unique, how is a common ethics or universal rights possible?

Criticism and Limitations

The Problem of the Universality of Plasticity

The concept of plasticity, central to Malabou's philosophy, despite its heuristic value, faces criticism regarding its universality. If plasticity is understood as the capacity for formation, deformation, and transformation, the question arises: is it equally applicable to all levels of being—from neurons to social structures? Christopher Watkin notes that Malabou's position contains an "irreconcilable ambiguity" between avoiding the "host capacity" approach and its hyperbolization [Watkin, 2016]. In other words, if plasticity becomes a "meta-ability" capable of transforming all traits, it risks losing its explanatory power, turning into a universal but empty principle. What then remains unchanged if everything is plastic? If there is no fixed substrate undergoing plastic changes, the very idea of change loses its meaning, as it becomes unclear what exactly changes.

Insufficient Attention to the Political Implications of Destructive Plasticity

Although Malabou explores "destructive plasticity" as the capacity for destruction and reformatting, her works, according to some critics, do not sufficiently analyze the political implications of this phenomenon. If trauma and destruction can lead to radical transformation of identity, how does this relate to issues of power, oppression, and resistance? Ainoa Suarez Gomez notes that Malabou offers a "radical rethinking of the modern subject," but her proposals for "forms of action aimed at achieving significant political and social changes" remain less developed compared to her ontological and neurophilosophical inquiries [Gómez, 2026]. Unlike Žižek, who directly calls for radical political acts, Malabou focuses on the ethics of caring for plasticity and its limits, which may be perceived as a less direct and more passive stance regarding active political intervention. This leaves open the question of how the concept of destructive plasticity can be used to analyze and counter systemic forms of violence and oppression, not only to understand individual trauma.

Conclusions

• Žižek and Malabou, despite different starting points, both critically rethink Hegelian dialectics and psychoanalysis, aiming for radical transformation of philosophical thought.
• Žižek emphasizes emptiness, rupture, and lack as constitutive elements of subjectivity and reality, whereas Malabou develops the concept of plasticity, highlighting the capacity for formation, deformation, and transformation.
• The difference in approaches to trauma manifests in that Žižek sees it as a source of subjectivation through a radical rupture with the Real, while Malabou views it as a threat to identity but simultaneously as an opportunity for reformatting through destructive plasticity.
• Both philosophers use Lacan, but Žižek focuses on the Real and jouissance, while Malabou emphasizes the symbolic and imaginary aspects of formation, reflecting their different emphases in understanding subjectivity.
• Their works intersect in critiquing traditional notions of the subject and its autonomy, as well as in searching for new forms of resistance, offering tools for understanding the contemporary crisis of subjectivity and political stagnation.
• Joint studies often analyze their dialogue around Hegelian dialectics and its contemporary reading, revealing how the dialectics of "emptiness" (Žižek) and "plasticity" (Malabou) serve as ways to comprehend becoming and change.
• How the concept of the "Pluriverse" can be integrated into these philosophical frameworks to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the multiplicity of realities and the decolonization of knowledge without falling into relativism?