The Uniqueness of Kierkegaard's Philosophy and Its Connection to Modernity

Introduction

Søren Kierkegaard's philosophy represents a radical departure from the dominant rationalist and systematic approaches of his time, primarily Hegelianism. He shifted the focus from abstract universals to concrete, existing human being, asserting that truth cannot be found in impersonal systems but must be subjectively appropriated by the individual [Ebelendu et al., 2021]. This emphasis on subjectivity and individual experience, on "truth as subjectivity," became a cornerstone of existential thought and anticipated many subsequent philosophical and psychological movements. Kierkegaard did not merely criticize Hegel but proposed an alternative path of knowing and being, where personal choice, faith, and existential states such as anxiety and despair play a central role in forming the authentic "self" [Li, 2019].

The uniqueness of Kierkegaard's philosophy lies in its deep focus on the inner world of the individual, their freedom and responsibility, as well as in the use of indirect communication and pseudonyms to engage the reader in the process of self-discovery rather than simply transmitting doctrine. He challenged traditional notions of reason and ethics by proposing the concept of the "leap of faith," which transcends their limits. These ideas profoundly influenced existentialism, psychoanalysis, and even postmodernism, compelling us to rethink the nature of human existence, authenticity, and meaning in a world often striving for unification and depersonalization. We will examine precisely what constitutes the uniqueness of Kierkegaard's philosophy and how his ideas continue to resonate in contemporary philosophy and psychoanalysis.

Detailed Exposition

How to Achieve Authentic Existence in the Conditions of Modernity?

The question of authentic existence seems to haunt humanity from the moment it becomes aware of its individuality. But what exactly does "authentic existence" mean, and how can it be achieved in a world that appears to constantly strive for unification and depersonalization? Kierkegaard, more than anyone else, placed this question at the center of his philosophy, challenging the dominant rationalist and systematic approaches of his time. He argued that truth is not an abstract, objective category accessible only to reason but a deeply subjective experience attained through personal choice and faith [Ebelendu et al., 2021].

Kierkegaard saw in his contemporary society a tendency for the individual to dissolve into a faceless mass, to lose the "true self" [Ebelendu et al., 2021]. Paradoxically, this problem has become even more relevant in our era of mass communication and social networks, where everyone strives to be unique yet fears standing out from others. For Kierkegaard, authenticity is not merely conformity to some external standards or ideals but rather an inner state requiring constant effort and choice. It is something that cannot be obtained from outside but must be painfully earned and acquired by the individual.

One of the key aspects of authenticity for Kierkegaard is individual choice and resistance to the "crowd." He criticized the idea that a person can find themselves by following the majority or submitting to social norms. On the contrary, he insisted that the true self manifests in moments when the individual dares to go against the current, to make decisions that may be misunderstood or even condemned by others. This requires courage, as such choices are often accompanied by anxiety and despair, which Kierkegaard regarded not as pathologies but as fundamental existential states opening the path to self-knowledge [Cunha et al., 2025].

In this context, psychoanalysis, especially in its existential form, finds much in common with Kierkegaard's understanding of authenticity. Jeremy Safran, for example, speaks of the "unbearable lightness of being" and the search for the "real" as central tasks in psychoanalytic practice [Safran, 2017]. For Safran, as for Kierkegaard, authenticity is not something static but a dynamic process, a constant striving for deeper understanding of oneself and one's place in the world. This search is often accompanied by discomfort because it requires confronting one's illusions and defenses.

Kierkegaard, through his pseudonyms such as Johannes de Silentio or Victor Eremita, demonstrated various modes of being, which he called "stages of existence": the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. The aesthetic stage is characterized by the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of responsibility; the ethical by acceptance of universal moral norms; and the religious by the individual "leap of faith," transcending the rational and ethical. Authenticity, according to Kierkegaard, is not achieved at the aesthetic stage, where one dissolves in momentary experiences, nor at the ethical stage, where one submits to external rules, but at the religious stage, where one enters into a unique relationship with God, assuming full responsibility for one's choice.

However, as Emmanuel Levinas notes in his review of Lev Shestov's work on Kierkegaard, the rebellion against rationalism and totalism, though important, can lead to "the vanity of personal protest" and replace external enslavement with subjective confinement [McLachlan, 2016]. This warning remains relevant today when individualism sometimes turns into self-admiration, and the search for authenticity into egocentrism. Kierkegaard, however, called not for isolation but for deep inner transformation, which paradoxically can lead to a deeper connection with others.

John Mills, exploring the connection between existentialism and psychoanalysis, emphasizes that both directions focus on the uniqueness of human experience and the necessity of confronting fundamental questions of existence [Mills, 2003]. For Kierkegaard, as for many existential psychoanalysts, authenticity is impossible without awareness of one's finitude and fragility. This awareness can provoke anxiety but also open the way to a more meaningful life.

Kierkegaard's influence on existential philosophy and psychoanalysis is undeniable. His ideas about anxiety, despair, choice, and responsibility have formed the basis of many contemporary approaches to understanding human existence. Karl Jaspers, for example, called Kierkegaard a "great awakener," whose philosophy remains relevant in a "fluid age," when life is often perceived as a stage and the individual risks losing themselves in the flow of mass culture [Granito, 2015]. Jaspers saw in Kierkegaard a call to "be oneself" and to open to the "hidden meaning" in the face of despair caused by the combination of homogenization and solipsism.

Authenticity is not a state of rest or completion but rather a continuous process of becoming. It is a constant effort of self-definition, of accepting responsibility for one's choices, even if they seem irrational or paradoxical. As Shannon Nason notes, Kierkegaard's theory of change is motivated by a "robust notion of contingency," which sharply contrasts with the "strong notion of absolute necessity" [Nason, 2012]. This means that a person is not predetermined but is constantly in the process of choosing and creating themselves.

Ultimately, the question of how to achieve authentic existence boils down to how to live under conditions of freedom and responsibility. Kierkegaard does not provide simple answers but offers a path requiring courage, faith, and readiness to face one's fears and doubts. He calls for active choice and acceptance of responsibility for one's own existence rather than passive contemplation [Ebelendu et al., 2021]. This path inevitably leads to confrontation with the paradoxes of faith and reason, which brings us to the next question: what is the relationship between philosophy and Christianity in Kierkegaard?

What Is the Relationship Between Philosophy and Christianity in Kierkegaard?

If in the previous section we discussed the search for authentic existence, the inevitable question arises: where does Kierkegaard see the path to this authenticity? For him, this path is inextricably linked with Christianity, but not with

How Does Kierkegaard Understand the Role of Reason and Faith?

In the previous section, we discussed how Kierkegaard constructs the relationship between philosophy and Christianity, emphasizing their fundamental difference and the impossibility of reducing one to the other. Now it is worth delving into how this thinker sees the role of reason and faith in human life, as this is one of the most paradoxical and often misunderstood aspects of his philosophy. For Kierkegaard, reason and faith are not merely two different cognitive faculties; they represent fundamentally different modes of being and knowing that cannot be reconciled or synthesized within any dialectical system.

Unlike many of his predecessors, Kierkegaard does not seek a rational justification of faith or reconciliation of religious dogmas with logic. On the contrary, he insists that faith is essentially irrational; it requires a "leap" across the abyss of reason. This does not mean that reason is useless or harmful; it is simply limited in its capacity to grasp existential truths. Reason operates with categories of the universal and objective, whereas faith concerns the unique, subjective, and paradoxical. As Allison notes, "given the assumption that the 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript' should be regarded as a contribution to religious or existential philosophy, the charge of irrationalism is irrefutable" [Allison, 1967]. However, Kierkegaard would likely accept this charge not as criticism but as confirmation of his position.

For Kierkegaard, truth is not objective knowledge that can be transmitted or proven but a subjective experience that constitutes the person. In his "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," he writes: "Truth is subjectivity." This statement often causes bewilderment since truth is traditionally associated with objectivity. However, for Kierkegaard, it is not about factual truth but the truth of existence, what matters to the individual. Objective truth accessible to reason may be indifferent to a person, not touching their existence. Subjective truth requires personal acceptance, decision, and risk.

Faith, in this context, becomes the highest form of subjectivity. It is not the result of logical inference or empirical observation. Faith is passion, the deepest inner conviction arising in confrontation with paradox. A classic example is the story of Abraham, who was ready to sacrifice his son Isaac at God's command, violating all ethical norms. Reason and ethics condemn such an act, but faith demands it. In this "leap of faith," Abraham suspends the ethical to enter into a unique relationship with God, an act of profound subjectivity and irrationality from the external observer's perspective.

However, it is important to understand that Kierkegaard does not advocate blind irrationalism or rejection of reason as such. Reason has its role, but its limits must be recognized. It can analyze and systematize but cannot answer questions about the meaning of existence, choice, or God. These questions require another kind of answer that comes through faith. Helms argues that Kierkegaardian scholars emphasize the tension between faith and reason more than Kierkegaard himself, confirming and perpetuating a broader hostility in our own cultural climate [Helms et al., 2017]. Perhaps Kierkegaard saw not so much antagonism as a difference in spheres of competence.

Faith, according to Kierkegaard, does not merely complement reason; it transforms it. It is not simply acceptance of dogmas but a "transforming vision," as formulated by M. Jamie Ferreira and others, which better explains the various facets of faith indicated by Westphal and the strengths of his approach (especially faith as passion), while avoiding conceptual and practical problems [Helms et al., 2017]. This vision allows a person to perceive the world and their place in it in a completely different way than is possible through the lens of pure reason. This vision does not negate reason but places it in a broader existential context.

The problem, however, is that for many of Kierkegaard's contemporaries, especially those accustomed to Hegelian dialectics, such an approach seemed regressive. Hegel sought synthesis, reconciliation of opposites into a higher truth. Kierkegaard insists on preserving the paradox, on the impossibility of resolving it. He does not offer easy answers but, on the contrary, complicates the task, demanding from the individual a personal, painful choice. This makes his philosophy uncomfortable, but it is precisely in this discomfort that its strength lies.

Ultimately, for Kierkegaard, faith is not intellectual assent to a set of propositions but an existential state in which a person fully commits to something beyond their rational understanding. It is an act of trust requiring courage and readiness to accept uncertainty. Reason can point to the limits of its knowledge, but only faith can cross these limits, opening the way to authentic existence. Without this "leap," a person remains captive to objectivity, in a world where everything is explainable but nothing has deep personal meaning. Kierkegaard does not simply separate reason and faith; he shows their fundamentally different functions and spheres of action. Reason is a tool for knowing the objective world; faith is a way of being in the subjective world, the world of meaning and values. This distinction has profound implications for understanding the human psyche, for it is precisely in this tension between the rational and the irrational, between objective knowledge and subjective experience, that many existential states such as anxiety and despair arise, which, as we will see later, become central themes for psychoanalysis and existential psychology.

Kierkegaard's Influence on Psychoanalysis and Existential Psychology

In the previous section, we discussed how Kierkegaard distinguishes reason and faith, emphasizing that true existence cannot be reduced to rational cognition. This idea of the priority of subjective experience and inner struggle over objective logic finds a deep resonance in psychoanalysis and existential psychology, where the unique world of the individual's experiences occupies a central place. Kierkegaard essentially laid the foundation for understanding that many internal conflicts and states later analyzed by psychologists stem not so much from pathology but from the very structure of human existence.

Existentialism and psychoanalysis, despite their differences, have deep historical connections, as Mills notes [Mills, 2003]. Both directions explore the deep layers of the human psyche, addressing the unconscious, fears, desires, and the quest for meaning. However, while Freud's psychoanalysis initially focused on repressed instincts and past traumas, existential psychology, inspired by Kierkegaard, shifts the emphasis to freedom, responsibility, and the inevitability of choice.

Kierkegaard's philosophy, especially his study of anxiety, serves as a cornerstone in existential thought [Cunha et al., 2025]. He did not consider anxiety a mere neurotic state but a fundamental affect arising from freedom and the possibility of choice. In his work "The Concept of Anxiety," Kierkegaard describes anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom," a sensation that arises when a person realizes the boundlessness of their possibilities and simultaneously the horror of responsibility for their choice. It is not fear of something specific but fear of nothingness, of potential that may be realized or lost.

This Kierkegaardian concept of anxiety has significantly influenced existential psychology, which, according to Koole, studies how people come to terms with the basic givens of human existence [Koole, 2010]. These givens include death, freedom, isolation, and meaninglessness. Unlike traditional psychology, which often seeks to eliminate anxiety as a symptom, existential psychology sees it as a potential for growth and self-knowledge. Confronting anxiety forces the individual to recognize their finitude and accept responsibility for their life, which is a step toward authentic existence.

Here we see how Kierkegaard anticipated many ideas later developed in psychoanalysis and existential therapy. For example, his understanding of despair as the "sickness unto death"—a state when a person does not want to be themselves or cannot be themselves—resonates with psychoanalytic concepts of narcissism and loss of self. Despair, for Kierkegaard, is not simply sadness but deep existential suffering related to the inability to accept oneself or find meaning in one's existence. It is a state when a person wants to be themselves but cannot, or does not want to be themselves but is forced.

Kierkegaard's influence also manifests in the emphasis on the patient's subjective experience. Modern medicine, as Shin and Chang note, often focuses on objective markers and laboratory tests, but these cannot fully capture what it means to experience pain. Philosophical thinking, by contrast, cultivates clinicians' ability to sit with ambiguity, tolerate uncertainty, and recognize that truth in medicine often arises through dialogue, narrative, and moral imagination, not only through algorithmic thinking. This approach, based on Gadamer's "fusion of horizons," requires the physician to deeply understand the patient's "lived experience," which directly resonates with Kierkegaard's priority on subjective truth.

Kierkegaard also emphasized the importance of the individual narrative. In the medical context, as Shin and Chang show, narrative medicine regards the patient's story not as an addition to the diagnosis but as a central component of healing. Training in narrative competence helps clinicians recognize plot, metaphor, voice, and silence in patients' accounts. This is not only ethically sensitive but diagnostically useful, revealing meanings that escape biomedical logic. Here we see a direct continuation of Kierkegaard's idea that truth cannot be universal and abstract; it is always deeply personal and contextual.

Moreover, Kierkegaard's philosophy contributes to an ontological shift in understanding the human being. Instead of viewing the body as a "malfunctioning machine" and the patient as a "carrier of problems," clinicians can begin to see patients as meaning-making beings embedded in social, cultural, and existential worlds. Pain, in this model, becomes not just tissue damage but a "rupture in the cosmos." This profound understanding of human suffering, which goes beyond purely physiological explanations, is directly connected to Kierkegaard's view of the human as a being constantly in the process of becoming and searching for meaning.

Existential psychology, developing Kierkegaard's ideas, explores how people cope with fundamental questions such as the meaning of life, freedom of choice, and the inevitability of death. For example, studies of quality of life in patients with chronic illnesses like myasthenia gravis show that existential aspects play a key role in their well-being. Confronting illness often leads to a reevaluation of values, loss of former identity, and the need to find new meanings, which directly reflects Kierkegaardian themes of despair and the search for authenticity.

Kierkegaard not only anticipated many ideas of psychoanalysis and existential psychology but also laid their philosophical foundation. His emphasis on subjectivity, anxiety, despair, and the necessity of choice opened new paths for understanding the human psyche beyond purely rationalist or biological explanations. He showed that the inner world of a person is not merely a set of mechanisms but a field of existential struggle where each individual is called to self-determination. This brings us to the next question: how does this call to self-determination manifest in ethics and moral choice?

How Does Kierkegaard Understand Ethics and Moral Choice?

Kierkegaard's influence on psychoanalysis and existential psychology, which we discussed earlier, is inseparably linked to his ethical views. If psychoanalysis seeks to understand internal conflicts and unconscious motives, and existential psychology aims to help a person find meaning and authenticity, Kierkegaard's ethics offers a path to this through radical moral choice. For him, ethics is not reduced to a set of rules or universal principles, as often happens in traditional philosophy. On the contrary, Kierkegaard sees ethics as a deeply personal, existential enterprise where each individual faces the necessity to take responsibility for their life and decisions.

Unlike Kant, Kierkegaard does not accept formal duty ethics for duty's sake, which he considers devoid of existential content [Martín et al., 2021]. Kantian ethics, based on universality and the rational nature of humans, abstracts from the concrete, living experience of the individual. For Kierkegaard, ethics is always rooted in the concrete situation, in the unique existence of the individual. He proposes a Christian ethics of love for neighbor and, above all, for God, which is a relational and existential ethics of the singular individual [Martín et al., 2021]. This is not merely a prescription but an inner state requiring constant choice and self-determination.

Moral choice for Kierkegaard is not simply a choice between good and evil in the conventional sense. It is a choice that defines the very essence of a person, their identity. Recall his concept of stages of existence: the aesthetic stage is characterized by the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of commitments; the ethical by acceptance of universal moral norms; and the religious by the radical "leap of faith," which may even suspend the ethical in its conventional understanding. This "leap" is not a rejection of morality but its reinterpretation on a deeper, personal level. It requires the individual to go beyond accepted categories and take responsibility before God, which often appears paradoxical from the perspective of secular ethics.

However, how can we understand this moral choice in everyday life, especially when it comes to suffering and illness? Contemporary research shows that even in medicine, where objective indicators seem to dominate, ethical choice and the patient's narrative play a key role. For example, Shin and Chang note that pain is not only a biological or personal phenomenon but also a political one. How pain is recognized, documented, and treated depends on institutional structures, funding, and cultural narratives. Some forms of pain are acknowledged, others ignored or pathologized, not because they are less real but because they do not fit biomedical explanations. This creates a situation where the ethical choice of the physician or healthcare system can lead to "social suffering," where the patient's pain is exacerbated by structural neglect. Here we see how formal ethics, ignoring the concrete experience of the individual, can lead to profound injustice.

Kierkegaard would likely agree that ethical choice cannot be reduced to protocol. It requires deep engagement and recognition of each person's uniqueness. In this context, the concept of narrative ethics proposed by Rudd becomes especially relevant. It emphasizes that personal identity and ethics are closely connected with how a person constructs their life story. The integrity of life, as Rudd says, is not a static state but a dynamic process where each choice shapes and reshapes the narrative of existence. This resonates with Kierkegaard's understanding of the ethical as a constant becoming rather than a fixed set of rules.

Consider, for example, the experience of people with chronic illnesses. Missel and Witting explore existential aspects of quality of life in patients with myasthenia gravis. They argue that quality of life under chronic illness is not the absence of struggle but the constant affirmation of existence, will, and purpose despite limitations. Physicians who adopt an existentially aware stance can create spaces where patients are not reduced to assessments or symptoms but are seen as full participants in shaping their lives. This requires an ethical approach that goes beyond purely medical indicators and includes dialogue, recognition of patient agency, and meaning-making.

Kierkegaard's ethics calls us to deep reflection on our own choices, to accepting responsibility for our unique lives. It does not offer easy answers but points to the complexity and paradox of moral existence. In a world where pain often becomes a "bureaucratic nuisance" and patients may be rejected as drug seekers or hysterics, Kierkegaard's emphasis on the singular individual and their existential choice becomes especially important. It reminds us that ethics is not merely rule-following but a constant effort to affirm humanity in each concrete case.

Ultimately, Kierkegaard's ethics is a call to authenticity. It demands not only doing the right things but being the right person, which means constant self-determination and acceptance of responsibility for one's unique path. But how applicable is this radical subjectivity in a modern society dominated by collective norms and institutional structures?

Criticism and Limitations

Kierkegaard's philosophy, despite its profound influence and relevance, is not without certain limitations and faces criticism often stemming from its radical subjectivity and anti-systematic nature. One key objection concerns his emphasis on "truth as subjectivity" and the "leap of faith." Critics such as Henry Allison argue that if "truth is subjectivity," this inevitably leads to irrationalism and "identification of Christianity with nonsense" [Allison, 1967]. If faith requires suspension of reason and ethics, how can one distinguish a genuine "leap of faith" from an arbitrary, ungrounded decision or even fanaticism? Kierkegaard does not offer clear criteria for such differentiation, leaving the individual alone with their inner experience, which can be interpreted as encouraging subjective arbitrariness rather than a path to authenticity. Without external, even minimal, guidelines, the concept of the "leap of faith" risks becoming a justification for any irrational act, undermining its ethical value.

Another limitation relates to the practical applicability of his philosophy in a modern, increasingly secularized and collectivist society. Kierkegaard calls for individual choice and responsibility, resistance to the "crowd," and the search for authenticity through the religious stage. However, as Emmanuel Levinas notes, commenting on Shestov, "the rebellion against rationalism and totalism" can turn into "the vanity of personal protest" and lead to "subjective confinement" [McLachlan, 2016]. In conditions where many people do not share Kierkegaard's religious beliefs, his path to authenticity through the "leap of faith" may seem inaccessible or even meaningless. How can a person who does not believe in God find authenticity within Kierkegaard's philosophy? Although existentialism and psychoanalysis have adapted many of his ideas to a secular context, Kierkegaard himself saw the religious stage as the only authentic one, which limits the universality of his teaching for non-religious individuals.

Finally, criticism also concerns the method of "indirect communication" and the use of pseudonyms. Although Kierkegaard used them to engage the reader in the process of self-discovery and avoid imposing ready-made truths, this also creates significant difficulties for interpreting his texts. It is not always clear where the position of the pseudonym ends and Kierkegaard's own position begins, leading to ambiguity and potential distortions of his thought. As J. H. Groth notes in his review of the "Concluding Unscientific Postscript," such a "subjectivist orientation" may be a "radical misunderstanding of Kierkegaard's intention" [Groth, 1942]. This methodological feature, intended to stimulate the reader's active thinking, simultaneously complicates systematic study and critical analysis of his philosophy, leaving open the question of how adequately we can understand his true convictions.